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FIERCE COMBAT ON FEWER BATTLEFIELDS
Copyright 1994 The New York Times Company
The New York Times
July 3, 1994, Sunday, Late Edition Final
Linda Greenhouse
THE Supreme Court term that ended
Thursday was a struggle: While the Justices decided
fewer cases than in any term since 1955, many of
the decisions they produced revealed deep divisions
and some bore the marks of raw ideological combat.
On a Court largely without a prevailing ideology,
cases have to be won and coalitions built case by
case.
The fleeting promise of unanimity that an
early ruling in a sexual harassment case appeared to
offer back in November faded quickly once the
Court began to wrestle with private-property rights,
redistricting, religion and public schools, and the
free-speech rights of abortion protesters.
Two voting-rights cases that disappeared
from view after they were argued on Oct. 4, the first
day of the term, finally emerged on the last day, and
it only then became apparent what had taken so long.
Justice Clarence Thomas, in his most
revealing personal statement since joining the Court
three years ago, produced a 59-page attack on what
he described as the "disastrous misadventure" of 30
years of judicial interpretation of the Voting Rights
Act.
Writing a separate opinion in a Georgia
voting-rights case, Justice Thomas said judges had
mistakenly assumed power under the law to draw
district lines on the basis of race. In doing so, he
said, the judiciary had "given credence to the view
that race defines political interest" and that
"members of racial and ethnic groups must all think
alike. "
Only Justice Antonin Scalia joined his
opinion. Four other Justices -- John Paul Stevens,
Harry A. Blackmun, David H. Souter, and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg -- attacked it as a "radical" attempt
to argue policy rather than law.
While Justice Thomas's view has no chance
of prevailing, the exchange itself highlighted the
Court's current dynamic: Justices Thomas and Scalia
at the extreme conservative end of the Court's
spectrum, and Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Souter
and Ginsburg occupying a place that, while certainly
not classically liberal, can be defined as liberal
relative to where the Court is today.
These four voted together in many of the
term's closely divided and most important cases.
They were on the same side in 11 of the term's 14
rulings that were decided by 5-to-4 votes, a group
that included major rulings on property rights and
criminal law as well as voting rights. In eight of
those 11 cases, the four Justices were the dissenters.
They prevailed as a group only in the three
criminal-law rulings in which Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy joined them.
Neither Justices Thomas, Scalia, Sandra Day
O'Connor or Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
ever joined the four in a 5-to-4 decision. However,
several of the term's most important decisions were
6-to-3 rulings, with a majority composed of Justices
Kennedy, O'Connor, Blackmun, Stevens, Souter and
Ginsburg. These included a decision that a public
school district that New York State created for a
village of Hasidic Jews was unconstitutional, and
another decision barring jury selection on the basis
of sex.
Justice Kennedy occupied the gravitational
center of the Court. He was never on the losing side
in a 5-to-4 decision, and he dissented in only five of
the term's 84 cases. His most notable dissent came
on Thursday, when he broke with the Chief Justice
and joined Justices Scalia and Thomas in their view
that an injunction against disruptive demonstrations
at a Florida abortion clinic was unconstitutional.
Justice O'Connor dissented 10 times, the
next-lowest number. The most frequent dissenter was
Justice Blackmun, who differed 28 times. Justice
Blackmun is retiring after a dramatic 24-year tenure
that saw him traverse the Court's ideological
spectrum to end his career as the Court's most
liberal member.
President Clinton's nominee to succeed him,
Judge Stephen G. Breyer, whose all-but-certain
confirmation will follow hearings that begin July 12,
will almost surely fit comfortably with Justice
Blackmun's three allies. Just as surely, he will not be
in a position to change the direction of the Court
even if he were so inclined.
Justice Ginsburg, President Clinton's first
Supreme Court nominee, made a vigorous debut that
reflected her long experience on a Federal appeals
court and her familiarity with many of the issues on
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the Court's docket. Of the four Justices in her wing
of the Court, she was the closest to the Court's
center.
In the 35 decisions that found Justice
Blackmun and Chief Justice Rehnquist on opposite
sides, Justice Ginsburg voted 19 times with Justice
Blackmun and 16 times with the Chief Justice.
By contrast, Justice Souter voted 24 times
with Justice Blackmun and 11 with the Chief Justice.
Justice Stevens voted 30 times with Justice Blackmun
and 5 with the Chief Justice.
This is a rough and mechanistic measure of
a Justice's views; admittedly, cases are not fungible,
and not all votes are equally weighty. But imprecise
as they are, such statistics do give at least a snapshot
of the Court's polarity at a given moment. In the 35
cases, Justice O'Connor voted 7 times with Justice
Blackmun and 27 times with the Chief Justice.
Justice Thomas voted 3 times with Justice Blackmun
and 32 times with the Chief Justice.
Justice Souter's emergence during his fourth
year on the Court as an anchor of the relatively
liberal wing was one of the term's notable
developments, although it was foreshadowed during
the previous two terms.
While Justice Souter is in no way a liberal in
the mold of Justice William J. Brennan Jr., whom he
succeeded, his brand of moderate pragmatism and
his willingness to engage Justice Scalia in direct
intellectual combat is probably as responsible as any
single factor for the failure of the conservative
revolution that finally appeared on the verge of
success with Justice Brennan's retirement.
Only one case this year could be counted as
a significant victory for the conservative agenda: a
5-to-4 ruling that limited the ability of governments
to place conditions on the use of private property.
The term's 84 cases marked a low point
after several years of marked decline in the Court's
argument docket. More cases than ever are reaching
the Court -- more than 7,700 new appeals were filed
this term, a record -- but the Justices are growing
increasingly selective about the ones they hear.
In the early to mid-1980's, the Court
commonly issued more than 140 decisions each term.
The number this year was the fewest since the 82
decisions of the 1955-56 term. The Court actually
heard 90 arguments this year, but six cases were
dismissed after argument or decided without full
opinions.
Following are summaries of the major
rulings of the term.
Abortion
A Buffer Zone To Protect Clinics Is Upheld, 6-3
The Justices did not revisit the question of
the fundamental right to abortion, nor are they likely
to in the foreseeable future. But cases spawned by
the controversy over abortion continue to reach the
Court; by a vote of 6 to 3, the Court upheld use of
a 36-foot buffer zone, the core of an injunction a
Florida state court issued to protect an abortion clinic
against disruptive protest. Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion, Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, No. 93-880, found the injunction consistent
with the First Amendment; Justices Scalia, Thomas
and Kennedy dissented.
In a second-clinic protest case, the Court
was unanimous in ruling that abortion clinics can
invoke the Federal racketeering law to sue violent
anti-abortion protest groups for damages. In an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court
rejected a lower court's conclusion that the
Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) applies only to activity motivated by a desire
for economic gain. (National Organization for
Women v. Scheidler, No. 92-780.)
Criminal Law
Tough Tactics To Fight Drugs Are Viewed
Skeptically
In a term that was generally conservative on
issues of criminal law, the Court nonetheless
displayed some skepticism toward the aggressive
tactics of state and Federal governments in
combatting drugs.
The Court ruled, 5 to 4, that the
Government may not seize a house or other real
estate that it suspects of having been used in a drug
transaction without giving the owner notice and a
chance to contest the seizure at a hearing. This case,
U.S. v. Good, No. 92-1180, involved a Federal
forfeiture law; many states have similar laws. Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion, based on the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law, was
joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Souter and
Ginsburg.
In a second 5-to-4 decision, with the same
lineup of Justices, the Court ruled that states may not
follow up a narcotics conviction by imposing a
special tax on the illegal drugs. The majority opinion
by Justice Stevens held that Montana's "dangerous
drug tax," similar to laws in about half the states,
violated the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy when applied to drugs that had already
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formed the basis of a criminal prosecution. (Montana
v. Kurth Ranch, No. 93-144.)
In a death penalty case, the Court ruled that
if the state seeks the death penalty on the ground that
the defendant will be dangerous in the future, jurors
must be told if the alternative to a death sentence is
life without parole, meaning that the defendant
would never in fact be released. The 7-to-2 decision,
with a plurality opinion by Justice Blackmun,
overturned a South Carolina death sentence reached
under a state law that forbids informing the jury that
a life sentence means life without parole. Justice
Scalia and Thomas dissented in Simmons v. S.C.,
No. 92-9059. By an 8-to-1 vote, with Justice
Blackmun dissenting, the Court turned back a
constitutional challenge to California's death penalty
law. (Tuileapa v. Calif., No. 93-5131.)
The Court ruled, 9 to 0, that prison officials
can be found liable for failing to protect an inmate
from violence at the hands of fellow prisoners if the
officials knew of but ignored a "substantial risk of
serious harm." The case, Farmer v. Brennan, No.
92-7242, involved the rape of a transsexual prisoner
whom officials had placed in the general population
at a Federal penitentiary. Justice Souter wrote the
opinion for the Court. Justice Thomas concurred
separately while reiterating his view that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment has no application to prison conditions.
Ruling, 5 to 4, the Court held that the police
are not obliged to stop questioning a suspect who
makes an ambiguous request to have a lawyer
present. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority
opinion, Davis v. U.S., No. 92-1949. The
dissenters, Justices Souter, Blackmun, Stevens and
Ginsburg, said the police had to stop long enough to
clarify the suspect's wishes.
By a 5-to-4 vote, the Court ruled that
Federal judges may grant a stay of execution to
permit a state death row inmate to find lawyer to
prepare a Federal court petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. Justice Blackmun's opinion, McFarland v.
Scott, No. 93-6497, was joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg and Kennedy.
Religion
Hasidic District Is at the Center Of Church-State
Case
In the term's only church-state case, the
Court declared by a vote of 6 to 3 that a public
school district created by New York State for the
benefit of a village of Satmar Hasidim amounted to
favoritism on behalf of religion and violated the
neutrality required by the First Amendment's
establishment clause. Justice Souter wrote for the
Court; Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and
Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented. (Board of
Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, No. 93-517.)
Individual Rights
Less Proof Is Required To Show Sexual Harassment
In the Workplace
The Court was unanimous in announcing a
wide definition of sexual harassment in the
workplace, rejecting the standard set by several
lower courts that required plaintiffs to show that
harassment had caused them "severe psychological
injury."
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor said
"no single factor is required" to prove to win a
sexual harassment case under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the law at issue. Invoking what
she called the "broad rule of workplace equality,"
Justice O'Connor said the law was violated when the
work environment "would reasonably be perceived,
and is perceived, as hostile or abusive." The case
was Harris v. Forklift Systems, No. 92-1168.
The Court completed a revolution in jury
selection by ruling that the Constitution's guarantee
of equal protection bars the exclusion of potential
jurors on the basis of their sex. In a 6-to-3 decision
by Justice Blackmun, the Court extended to gender
the analysis it had previously applied to prohibit the
use of peremptory challenges to weed out jurors on
the basis of race. The Chief Justice and Justices
Scalia and Thomas dissented. The case was J.E.B. v.
T.B., No. 92-1239. The Justices later declined to
hear a case from Minnesota that posed the question
of whether the same principle should also be
extended to religion.
The Court ruled that the Civil Rights Act of
1991, in which Congress restored and expanded
remedies for job discrimination in response to a
series of restrictive Supreme Court rulings two years
earlier, did not apply retroactively to the thousands
of cases that were pending when the law was passed.
The Court addressed different aspects of the law in
a pair of 8-to-1 decisions, with Justice Stevens
writing the majority opinions and Justice Blackmun
dissenting. The cases were Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, No. 92-757, and Rivers v. Roadway
Express, No. 92-938.
In an important voting-rights case from
Florida, the Court ruled that the Federal Voting
Rights Act does not necessarily require creating the
maximum number of legislative districts in which
minority-group voters make up a majority. Justice
Souter wrote an opinion for seven Justices while the
other two, Justices Thomas and Scalia, said the
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Voting Rights Act does not apply to challenges to
district lines. (Johnson v. DeGrandy, No. 92-519.)
By a 5-to-4 vote in a Georgia case, the
Court ruled that the Voting Rights Act could not be
used to challenge the size of a governmental body, in
that case a single-member commission that runs rural
Bleckley County. There was no majority rationale;
separate opinions by Justice Kennedy, joined by the
Chief Justice; Justice O'Connor; and Justice Thomas
joined by Justice Scalia made up the majority.
(Holder v. Hall, No. 91-2012.)
Government Authority
Developers Get A Break on The Environment
In an important property-rights case, the
Court set new limits on the ability of governments to
require developers to set aside part of their land for
environmental or other public uses. Under Chief
Justice Rehnquist's 5-to-4 majority opinion, the
Government has the burden of showing a "rough
proportionality" between the required set-aside and
the harm, such as flooding or increased traffic, to be
caused by the new development.
The decision, Dolan v. City of Tigard, No.
93-518, was based on the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition against a governmental "taking" of
private property without compensation; Chief Justice
Rehnquist said the takings clause should no longer be
"relegated to the status of a poor relation" within the
Bill of Rights. The dissenters were Justices Stevens,
Blackmun, Ginsburg and Souter.
The Court ruled unanimously that the
Government's choice of which military bases to close
is not subject to challenge in Federal court. Elected
officials from Pennsylvania and New Jersey had
gone to court to try to stop the scheduled closing of
the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote for the Court in Dalton v. Specter,
No. 93-289.
By a vote of 9 to 0, the Court overturned a
$52 million civil contempt fine a Virginia state court
had issued against the mine workers' union in
connection with a violent strike, ruling that such a
fine could not be imposed without giving the union
the procedural protections of a criminal trial. Justice
Blackmun wrote the opinion, Mine Workers v.
Bagwell, No. 92-1625.
Speech
Home Is Castle When It Comes To Posting Signs
The Court ruled unanimously that cities may
not bar residents from posting signs on their own
property. The decision, City of Ladue v. Gilleo, No.
92-1856. struck down an ordinance that banned all
but "for sale" and "sold" signs from the homes and
lawns of a wealthy St. Louis suburb. Justice Stevens
wrote for the Court.
In an important cable television case, a
5-to-4 majority endorsed a broad constitutional
framework for Federal regulation of cable television
while, at the same time, telling a lower court to
reconsider its ruling that upheld a Federal law that
requires cable systems to retransmit local broadcast
signals. The Court will inevitably revisit the issue
when the case, Turner v. Federal Communications
Commission, No. 93-44, comes back after further
proceedings. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court
while the dissenters -- Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Thomas and Ginsburg -- said the "must carry" law
violates the cable operators' editorial freedom under
the First Amendment.
In a high-profile copyright case, the Court
ruled unanimously that parody -- in this case, the rap
group 2 Live Crew's raunchy version of the rock
classic "Oh Pretty Woman" -- is not necessarily
copyright infringement but may be protected under
the Federal copyright law as "fair use." Justice
Souter wrote the opinion, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose,
No. 92-1292.
The Environment
Steering the Flow Of Garbage Grows Complicated
The Court decided an unusual number and
variety of controversies over waste disposal and
regulation. The most important ruling threatened an
increasingly popular approach to waste disposal
known as flow control, in which local governments
try to make expensive recycling or incineration
plants economical by insisting that all trash generated
within their borders be sent to the designated facility.
The Constitution's protection against state
interference with interstate commerce does not
permit local governments to "hoard a local
resource," the Court ruled in a 6-to-3 decision by
Justice Kennedy. The Chief Justice and Justices
Souter and Blackmun dissented in C. & A. Carbone
v. Clarkstown, No. 92-1402.
The Court also rejected, as another
protectionist offense against interstate commerce,
Oregon's imposition of an extra dumping fee for
solid waste brought in from another state. Justice
Thomas wrote the 7-to-2 decision, Ore. Waste
Systems v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, No.
93-70. The Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun
dissented.
In another 7-to-2 ruling, the Court held that
any toxic residue created by burning household and
industrial waste in municipal incinerators must be
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treated as hazardous waste and not dumped in
ordinary landfills. The decision, Chicago v.
Environmental Defense Fund, No. 92-1639,
interpreting a Federal environmental law, could
substantially increase the costs of municipal waste
disposal. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion
and Justices Stevens and O'Connor dissented.
Upholding state authority in an
environmental case, the Court ruled, 7 to 2, that
states have broad authority under the Federal Clean
Water Act to protect not only the quality of their
water but also the quantity that flows through
hydroelectric projects. Water must flow at certain
levels to make it possible for salmon, trout and other
fish to survive. Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court
in Jefferson County v. Washington, No. 92-1911.
Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented.
Business, Taxes
Juries That Grant Huge Damages Can Be Reined In
In one of its clearest rulings on the
contentious subject of punitive damages, the Court
held that as a matter of constitutional due process,
states must make some form of judicial review
available as a check on the amount of punitive
damages awarded by a jury. While only Oregon now
fails to provide such review, the broad tone of the
decision, Honda Motor Co. v. Obert, No. 93-644, is
likely to invite more challenges to punitive damages.
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion and
Justice Ginsburg and Chief Justice Rehnquist
dissented.
Sweeping aside years of lower court
precedents, as well as Securities and Exchange
Commission policy, the Court barred a common type
of securities-fraud action under which accountants
and other outside professionals could be sued for
"aiding and abetting" a securities fraud. The 5-to-4
opinion, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, No.
92-854, was by Justice Kennedy.
The Court ruled, 9 to 0, that Congress did
not violate the constitutional guarantee of due
process when it amended a 1986 tax law
retroactively to close an unintended loophole. Justice
Blackmun wrote for the Court in U.S. v. Carlton,
No. 92-1941.
The Court unanimously validated New York
State's effort to curb tax evasion in the sale of
cigarettes at stores located on Indian reservations,
ruling that the coupon system New York plans to use
to limit the availability of cigarettes to non-Indians
does not conflict with Federal law. Justice Stevens
wrote for the Court in New York v. Milhelm Attea,
No. 93-377.
The Court upheld California's former
approach to taxing the income of foreign-based
multinational corporations. California has changed its
law to conform to the rest of the country, but had
the 7-to-2 decision in Barclays Bank v. Franchise
Tax Board, No. 92-1384, gone the other way,
California might have faced a $4 billion retroactive
liability for refunds. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the
Court and Justices O'Connor and Thomas dissented.
Copyright o 1994 by The New York Times
Company. Reprinted by permission.
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COURT MOVES BACK TO LEGAL MIDDLE
Copyright 1994 Gannett Company, Inc.
USA Today
July 1, 1994, Friday, Final Edition
Tony Mauro
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia said in
a recent lecture that the time-honored tradition of
dissenting from court rulings gives him "unparalleled
pleasure."
If that's true, the court's conservative leader
had the time of his life this week by authoring a pair
of angry dissents that show just how isolated he is,
and how moderate the court has become.
The term that began last October and ended
Thursday was not a good one for Scalia or for
conservatives generally, particularly in the civil
rights and liberties area.
For eight remarkable minutes Thursday,
Scalia read from a dissent that attacked the court
majority for giving judges the power to limit protests
around abortion clinics.
"The court is making new law and bad law,"
he said.
On Monday, Scalia offered another bitter
dissent, this time attacking the court for striking
down a New York school district that accommodated
the needs of Hasidic Jews. He said the decision
showed the court's intolerance for religion.
During the Reagan and Bush administrations,
Scalia was designated the court's intellectual magnet
to draw the justices to the right.
Instead, Scalia often finds himself in the role
of angry dissenter - joined almost always by
Clarence Thomas and less often by Chief Justice
William Rehnquist.
The emergence of Justice David Souter as
moderate leader of the court, bolstered by the
addition this term of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, has
moved the court back toward the legal middle.
Clinton nominee Stephen Breyer, whose
confirmation hearings start July 12, is likely to
bolster the trend.
Souter, 54, was appointed by President Bush
in 1990 as a justice who gave conservatives hope.
"He had the image of a real tough hanging judge,"
says Alan Slobodin of the Washington Legal
Foundation. "That clearly hasn't been the case."
Souter authored this week's ruling on the
religious school district. He dismissed Scalia as a
gladiator who "thrusts at lions of his own
imagining."
The court this term was still sharply
conservative on most criminal law issues, including
the death penalty. And the justices made business
happy last week with rulings limiting punitive
damages and strengthening property rights.
But in a number of First Amendment and
civil rights rulings, the court was sympathetic to
liberal points of view.
-- The court granted the cable industry
increased First Amendment protection.
-- A Ladue, Mo., sign ordinance that was
used to keep resident Margaret Gilleo from placing
an anti-war sign on her front lawn was struck down.
-- The justices strengthened the protection
for commercial speech or advertising.
-- The court made it easier to win
sexual-harassment lawsuits and barred gender
discrimination in jury selection.
"The center of the court is beginning to look
like an ACLU boardroom, " says New York
University law professor Burt Neuborne.
American Civil Liberties Union legal
director Steve Shapiro didn't go that far, but said:
"This no longer looks like a court that seems intent
on dismantling the Bill of Rights."
Copyright 1994, USA TODAY. Reprinted with
permission.
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A DIFFERENT SORT OF COURT AWAITS BLACKMUN SUCCESSOR
Recent Terms Marked By Aversion to Change
Copyright 1994 The Washington Post
The Washington Post
April 17, 1994, Sunday, Final Edition
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
The Supreme Court that Justice Harry A.
Blackmun joined in 1970 had been fanning the fires
of social revolution for more than a decade.
Under Chief Justice Earl Warren, who
retired in 1969, the court struck down segregation,
ordered voting districts redrawn, made police go
easier on criminal suspects and prohibited states from
regulating birth control.
The court that Blackmun's successor will
join, in contrast, has been in a holding pattern.
Controlled by cautious conservatives, the
court in recent terms has reversed few precedents
and broken little ground. Instead, it has tinkered at
the margins of the law in criminal cases, religion
disputes and civil rights.
The court's aversion to change is matched
by a dramatic drop in its opinions.
In the 1970s, the court handed down an
average of 130 rulings per term. In the 1980s, it
issued about 140 opinions each term. But in recent
years, the court has been taking fewer and fewer
cases. This term, based on the cases the justices have
agreed to review, the court is expected to issue 85
rulings.
That would be the fewest rulings since 1961
-- a time when society was far less litigious. In 1961,
about 2,000 appeals came to the court; last term,
about 6,000.
"My theory is that the court has made a
semiconscious judgment that it had been occupying
too much public attention," said Georgetown law
professor Mark V. Tushnet. "They are trying to play
down their role in government."
Other theories on why the court is deciding
fewer cases include: that the conservative justices are
in sync with the conservative-dominated lower
courts, so they are simply allowing more lower court
rulings to stand; and that the justices think social
problems are the province of elected lawmakers.
Some court observers speculate that the justices,
concerned about quality control, want to give more
attention to fewer cases. Others say that the number
of unanswered legal questions is diminishing.
"The Casey term took a lot out of all of us,"
said one recent former clerk, referring to the
1991-92 term in which the justices narrowly upheld
the right to abortion in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. "No one wanted
to handle any more controversy after that."
But the current shifting alliances on the court
also may prevent any real movement on big issues.
It takes four of the nine justices to agree for any case
to be heard. Secret voting takes place at a conference
each Friday.
"There's no real faction in control that has
an agenda," said another former clerk. "If someone
like [Antonin] Scalia felt he had five votes to do
something, he would vote to take more cases. But
there's not a united five-vote bloc to change the law
in any given way."
One consequence of the court's reduction in
cases and narrow rulings has been that groups with
large social concerns have been turning to state
courts or elected lawmakers.
"Twenty years ago, the Supreme Court was
virtually the only game in town for people seeking to
vindicate their civil and constitutional rights, " said
Steven Shapiro, legal director for the American Civil
Liberties Union. "Increasingly, the state courts are
becoming as important as the Supreme Court as
engines for social change."
Barbara Sinclair, a political science
professor at the University of California at
Riverside, said, "If the chances of even getting heard
at the court are down, that puts additional pressure
on the other branches" of the federal government.
Johnny Killian, a legal scholar at the Library
of Congress, said that when the court pulls back, the
executive branch typically gets the last word on how
legislation should be interpreted.
When Blackmun came onto the high court,
he joined several legal giants. The other justices
were Hugo F. Black, William 0. Douglas, John
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Marshall Harlan, William J. Brennan Jr., Potter
Stewart, Byron R. White, Thurgood Marshall and
newly named chief Warren E. Burger.
The court had had its fingers in everything:
police powers, school policy, contraceptives.
President Richard M. Nixon, who appointed Burger,
Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell Jr. and William H.
Rehnquist, had said he wanted to end the court's
"activist" approach.
But the expected counterrevolution never
happened. The court continued to issue rulings that
provoked the public. The justices barred states from
outlawing abortion. They endorsed affirmative action
and said employers could be sued for discrimination
based on statistics that showed blacks were
disproportionately excluded from good jobs.
So by 1980, when Ronald Reagan was
running for president, he spoke to people who
wanted the court out of their lives and businesses.
He promised to appoint justices who would not
"legislate" from the bench.
And after Reagan elevated Rehnquist to chief
justice in 1986, things began to change. He was
assisted by other Reagan appointees, Sandra Day
O'Connor in 1981, Scalia in 1986, and Anthony M.
Kennedy in 1988. President George Bush added
David H. Souter in 1990 and Clarence Thomas in
1991.
By the late 1980s, it was plain that the court
was not going to read into legislation what elected
lawmakers had failed to write into it. Some
professors have argued that restraint actually
produces a reverse "activism." When the Rehnquist
court in 1989 upheld a restrictive Missouri abortion
law and narrowly interpreted job-bias laws, making
it harder for workers to sue, some members of
Congress accused the court of actively carrying out
a politically conservative agenda.
But the lunge to the right was short-lived,
and the swing votes at the center, O'Connor,
Kennedy and Souter, have blocked any move to
either extreme.
While few court scholars would say it is
necessarily good or bad that the court decides fewer
cases -- so much depends on what they are -- many
observers agree that conflicting rulings have been
allowed to stand.
For example, the court in 1992 prohibited
prayer at public school graduation ceremonies. But
one year later it refused to intervene when an appeals
court, covering Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi,
permitted prayer at a public school graduation. As a
result, nationwide organizations for, and against,
prayer in schools have bombarded educators with
literature promoting, or decrying, student prayer.
Before Justice White retired last year, he
routinely complained that the justices were bypassing
important cases. He wrote that the court was
allowing federal law to be "administered in different
ways in different parts of the country; citizens in
some circuits are subject to liabilities or entitlements
that citizens in other circuits are not burdened with
or entitled to."
White has declined to be interviewed since
his retirement and did not respond to several recent
inquiries to his office.
A new generation of disputes will face
Blackmun's successor -- on gay rights, congressional
term limits and physician-assisted suicide, to name a
few. How large a role the court takes on those issues
and older ones, like abortion, voting rights and the
death penalty, will be up to the successor and the
other justices.
"Here's how history plays funny tricks:
When Nixon put his justices on the court, he was
concerned above all about activism on law and
order," said University of Virginia law professor
A.E. Dick Howard, referring to the GOP belief that
the court was meddling in police procedure. In the
well-known 1966 decision Miranda v. Arizona, for
example, the court ruled that police officers were
required to tell suspects they have the right to remain
silent.
But then, said Howard, the court went on a
liberal spree in other areas: making abortion legal
nationwide, allowing mandatory school busing for
desegregation and striking down the death penalty as
it was administered in the early 1970s. He said that
the social dilemmas of the future, as well as a new
justice, could again revolutionize the court.
o 1994. The Washington Post. Reprinted with
permission.
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TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNCLE SAM
Copyright 1994 Guardian Newspapers Limited
The Guardian
April 9, 1994
Martin Walker
THE importance of the US Supreme Court
rises in precise proportion to the cowardice of
America's politicians, or at least their reluctance to
assume the responsibility for enacting overdue social
reforms.
When Congress and President shrank from
offending the electorate by enacting the right of
black citizens to equal and public education, or
protecting the right of a woman to decide her own
procreative destiny, they thrust forward the nine
unelected lawyers of the Supreme Court to do the
job.
Sometimes, the court can do real dirty work.
The Supreme Court helped plunge the young nation
into its civil war, with its 1857 decision in the Dred
Scott case that blacks were not and could not become
US citizens. It justified the prosecution of a real war
in a most unpleasant way in 1944, upholding the
right of the government to incarcerate US citizens of
Japanese ancestry in concentration camps.
The court's sweeping legal powers in this
most legalistic of nations explains the extraordinary
interest which America takes in the coming and
going of its justices. The decision last week of an
85-year-old lawyer, Harry Blackmun, finally to
announce his retirement, was treated in the American
media with the reverence usually accorded the
passing of a major statesman.
Quite right too. Harry Blackmun, of
Harvard College and Harvard Law School, and then
house lawyer to the Mayo Clinic, took credit in his
years on the bench for a series of social reforms and
enactments which most countries would have
reserved for elected politicians.
In 1973 he authored the court's judgement in
the case of Roe versus Wade which established a
woman's constitutional right to an abortion. It
stretched the vague right of privacy in the
Constitution (Fourth Amendment: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons . . . shall not be
violated") to protect a woman's right to choose in
what conservatives have since denounced as judicial
activism which invented, rather than simply
interpreted the law.
The 1977 decision, which Justice Blackmun
wrote, striking down state attempts to ban lawyers'
advertisements on the grounds that it violated the
right to free speech, has similarly far reaching
implications. It stands like a giant roadblock in the
path of any attempt to reform America's ridiculous
and inherently corrupt way of financing their
political system.
Any suggestion that candidates' air time
should be limited, or of a curb on the power of
moneybags to swamp the voters with as much
political publicity as the candidate can buy, must
first deal with Justice Blackmun's decision.
His abortion judgement and his recently
announced conversion against the death penalty,
helped inspire a flood of liberal nostalgia this week.
In fact, he was appointed by Richard Nixon
as a conservative but turned against his president to
vote with the verdict during the Watergate affair that
the President did not have the right to withhold
evidence needed in a criminal trial.
In an America of politicians who fear the
vengeance of the voters and the lobbies, Justice
Blackmun and his fellows have taken over that role
Shelley defined for the poets as "the unacknowledged
legislators".
The court's prerogatives range far beyond
the workings of the judicial system. The right of an
employer, or of a university, to give preference to
women and ethnic minorities in hiring and
promotion, was established in two landmark cases in
1978 and 1979.
But those were the years of the broadly
liberal court, the result of the long years of the
Democratic party's control of White House in the
1930s, 1940s and 1960s. Because Supreme Court
justices sit for life, they continue to exert the
political influence of the administration which picked
them for decades thereafter.
The conservative court of the 1990s was the
result of the Republican years of the 1980s and
earlier, and America will reckon with the
Reagan-Bush appointments of Justices William
Rehnquist (a Nixon choice), Antonin Scalia
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(Reagan's pick) and the black Justice Clarence
Thomas (Bush's man) for years to come.
Indeed, the long years of Republican
dominance of the White House would have installed
a solidly conservative court - and allowed the
individual states to outlaw abortion - save for the
readiness of justices to confound all expectations.
President Ford's choice, John Paul Stevens,
and two of Reagan's nominees, Sandra Day
O'Connor (the first woman) and Anthony Kennedy,
have become moderates, refusing to reverse that
landmark decision on abortion which has wracked
America for two decades.
And Justice David Souter of New
Hampshire, another Bush choice, has joined
O'Connor and Kennedy in a centrist group which
now holds the balance in the court.
Since the court rules by majority vote, and
its politicisation has led to a spate of 5-4 decisions of
late, this balance - and thus President Clinton's
choice of replacement for Harry Blackmun is
crucial.
There are three main issues which the court
will probably soon face, since the politicians are
likely to duck them. The first is the death penalty,
outlawed briefly by the court in 1972 at the end of
the liberal area. Justice O'Connor opposed it before
she joined the Supreme Court, and the vote is now
finely balanced. The second and third are sexual
discrimination against women and against gays.
Here again, Justice O'Connor may hold the
key. This tennis-mad fitness fanatic from an Arizona
ranch, who recalls sleeping on cases of dynamite in
the back of her daddy's old jalopy, electrified a
women's conference recently by blaming the lack of
women in power on "blatant sex discrimination - we
have a long way to go before women are on an equal
footing with men".
If a new liberal majority is emerging, it will
require emollient leadership, which explains why the
current front runner is the outgoing Senate Majority
leader, George Mitchell. He knows something about
rallying prickly egos into line.
With President Clinton beset by Whitewater,
he cannot afford a bruising confirmation battle in the
Senate, and Mitchell could expect an easy ride from
his Senate colleagues. And although the New York
Times sniffs that yet another white male justice
would hardly fulfill the Clinton promise to make the
institutions of state "look like America", Mitchell is
of Lebanese ancestry.
The risk remains that justices can change in
office. Clinton's only selection so far, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, is already looking rather less liberal than
expected. But America could be heading for a
Supreme Court which will finally outlaw the death
penalty. Ironically, that was the tough-on-crime
credential which helped Bill Clinton get elected.
The Guardian o
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TRUST US
You May Not Understand What We Say, But That's the Way We Like It. We're
Mysterious. We're the Supreme Court. And We're Here for Life.
Copyright 1994 Washington Magazine, Inc.
Washingtonian
February, 1994
Andrew Ferguson
WHY IS IT that Supreme Court justices
hardly ever appear in Washington novels? Consider
the stock characters: the dipso Southern senator, the
avuncular secretary of state, the right-wing general,
the hormonally supercharged congressman, the
network-news twinkie. . . not a Supreme Court
justice in the bunch.
In 1981, a movie starring Walter Matthau
and Jill Clayburgh tried to correct the deficiency.
First Monday in October is the best movie ever
made about the Supreme Court. It is, in fact, the
only movie ever made about the Supreme Court. The
producers did strive to convey the court's grandeur:
Handel's Water Music washes over the audience
whenever the screen shows the court's temple on
First Street, Northeast. But when the camera moves
inside, all efforts at verisi-mulitude drop away.
Walter mugs and Jill looks implausibly thoughtful.
The movie bombed. Not even Miss Clayburgh's
performance -- as the first female justice of the
Supreme Court to do a shower scene -- could redeem
its dramatic shortcomings.
The title First Monday in October refers to
the opening date of the court's annual term. When it
convened last October, it did at last promise some
real-life drama. The occasion marked the first
appearance of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the
second woman appointed to the court and the first
Democratic appointee in 25 years. Unfortunately, her
star appeal more closely resembles Imogene Coca's
than Jill Clayburgh's. In her debut, even Justice
Ginsburg was unable to overcome the tedium.
The justices like it that way. Which is why
they're so dangerous. In his book, The Supreme
Court: How It Was, How It Is, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist called the court "one of the best tourist
sights in Washington." No one will confuse it with
the National Museum of Air and Space, but
unsuspecting tourists come by the bus-load anyway.
On days the court is in session, the queue snakes
across the plaza and down the block.
As the crowds wait to enter, the temple
looms above them as a mood-setter, a symbol of
ageless power and indestructibility meant to suggest
the Parthenon, which was blown up by Turks. The
court does only a small portion of its business in
public: during oral arguments, held Mondays,
Tuesdays, and Wednesdays of the first two weeks of
every month from October through April, and on
days when its opinions are handed down, through
June. Cameras and recording devices are not
allowed, in keeping with the cloistered professional
lives the justices otherwise lead. They never hold
press conferences, rarely give speeches, and seldom,
during business hours, venture out of the sealed-off
corridors of the temple, which they reach through an
underground parking garage and private elevator.
The conceit is that justices are removed from
the whirlwinds and tidal waves of democratic
government, a rare breed whose eyes rise above
popular passion, elevated always to the Law.
The opening ceremony is meant to augment
this sense of mystery and majesty. The unwashed
pass through metal detectors and massive bronze
doors to the chamber itself, a marble room built to
the dimensions of a college gym, but with worse
acoustics and no cheerleaders. Impossibly tall
curtains of red plush fall between twin columns of
white marble. A frieze depicting lawgivers through
the ages adorns the upper walls. There is much brass
and gold brocade. It looks like a set from Samson
and Delilah.
In the center of the chamber is a large area
for lawyers of the bar; the press sits in an apse to
one side. Spectators are rotated in and out in small
groups every few minutes as the session progresses.
Their seating area, farthest from the bench, holds
about 200. Guards circumnavigate it with the
bullying air of hall monitors.
With a whap of the gavel, the curtains part
behind the bench, and the justices enter in groups of
three. The clerk hollers: "Oyez, oyez, oyez!
[legalese for "Soup's on!"] The Honorable, the Chief
Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States. All persons having
business before this Honorable Court are admonished
to draw nigh and give their attention, for the court is
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now sitting. God save the United States and this
Honorable Court."
By the time the clerk finishes, the justices
are seated, and the tourists have their first good look
at them. "I know of no other regularly scheduled
occasion," the chief justice wrote in his book, "on
which strangers to the Nation's Capital can be
guaranteed a view of so many persons responsible
for the functioning of one of the three branches of
the United States government." It is a salutary
guarantee, but ironic: As you watch the faces of
these assembled Americans, fresh off the tour bus, it
is clear that not one of them has the slightest idea
who these nine people are. Most consult seating
charts provided by the court. Not even Clarence
Thomas, star of one of the highest-rated shows in
television history, seems to rouse a flicker of
recognition. I noticed a frission pass through the
crowd only once, when Nina Totenberg came in late.
You can't fault the public for its ignorance. The
justices are not a particularly noteworthy bunch.
Their black robes are another suggestion of majestic
imperturbability, creating the illusion that beneath
each austere cloak beats the heart of a legal giant.
The illusion is crucial, for without the robes most of
the justices look as if they were gathered at random
from the nearest shuffleboard court.
In fact, they were recruited from the swamps
of American politics -- either electoral politics or,
what is even less promising, the politics of the
American legal establishment.
By tradition, an appointment to the Supreme
Court rewards a long career of bar-association
schmoozing, political hack work, and assiduous
bum-bussing. The only current exceptions to the rule
are Justices Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia. Both had
distinguished legal careers before coming to the
court -- Scalia as a scholar and Ginsburg as a skilled
and creative litigator.
A quick glance at their colleagues shows
less-impressive qualifications.
At the far end of the bench sits Justice
Thomas, perhaps the most famous person in the
court after Nina Totenberg. The politics of his
appointment to succeed the court's first black justice,
Thurgood Marshall, need little elaboration -- it was,
said the press and others, selection by quota, which
Thomas opposes on constitutional grounds.
Next to Thomas is Anthony Kennedy, who
came to the court after a languid career as a law
professor at a third-tier law school and several years
on a federal appeals court, where his tough-on-crime
opinions drew the attention of Reaganites. He was
President Reagan's third choice to fill the seat.
As a presidential candidate hungry for
women's votes in 1980 Reagan pledged that his first
Supreme Court appointment would be a woman.
When the chance came, he reached deep into the
nation's judiciary, all the way down to an
intermediate state court of appeals in Arizona, to
find Sandra Day O'Connor, an old friend of
Rehnquist's, an acolyte of Reagan's mentor Barry
Goldwater, and a good soldier in the state's
right-wing politics.
Next to her sits the court's oldest justice,
Nixon appointee Harry Blackmum, who came to the
court as a close friend of then-Chief Justice Warren
Burger. President Nixon knew Burger, in turn,
because Burger was once Harold Stassen's campaign
manager. Of all the credentials that have ensured
justices a place on the Supreme Court, Blackmun's
may be the most dubious: the friend of a friend of
Harold Stassen's.
In the center sits Chief Justice Rehnquist,
appointed to the court by Nixon after a long career
as a lawyer-political activist in Arizona and a briefer
career in John Mitchell's Justice Department, which
eventually gave us Watergate. Reagan made him
chief justice.
Next is Justice John Paul Stevens, brought to
President Ford's attention by then-Attorney General
Ed Levi, who had enjoyed many pleasant
bar-association conventions with Stevens.
Justice David Souter, to Scalia's left, was
plucked from obscurity by John Sununu. As
governor of New Hampshire, Sununu had appointed
Souter to the state Supreme Court in return for
Souter's lengthy servitude at the feet of New
Hampshire's Republican pols. He may be the only
man in Washington who doesn't regret sucking up to
Sununu; at least he still has a job.
Next to Souter, at the far end of the bench,
sits Justice Ginsburg, but it is Souter who embodies
the modern Court. Beyond his experience as a
political coat-holder, his chief qualification was that
no one could tell whether he was qualified or not.
Some eynies dubbed him the "Stealth nominee."
Before settling on Souter, the Bush
administration did consider nominating judges and
scholars of distinction. But the idea was quickly
dismissed. Their paper trails -- articles and written
opinions that indicate an intellectual engagement with
constitutional issues -- disqualified them as "too
controversial," particularly for confirmation in a
Democratic-controlled Senate. With his brief career
on the state bench, Souter was, like most of his
colleagues, blessedly unburdened by any evidence of
distinction.
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Even better, he had for years lived in a
cabin in the woods, far from the fleshpots where
even the most timid lawyers can sometimes be lured
into indiscretions that might haunt them as nominees.
Phlegmatic, average, politically well-connected:
Souter comfortably took a place among his peers.
After brief formalities, oral arguments begin.
The court receives petitions to hear more than 6,000
cases a year but agrees to hear arguments in fewer
than 150. An hour is set aside for each case, with
the time split between the two sides. The lawyers
already have filed their briefs, which the justices are
presumed to have read. In these the arguments are
presented entire; the oral presentations make the
lawyers available for grilling by the justices.
The degree of interest each justice displays
varies from case to case. Thomas is famously silent;
since he's been on the court, he has asked only a
handful of questions during oral arguments. He leans
far back in his chair, folds his hands in front of his
face, occasionally makes notes, and sometimes
consults law books he keeps on the bench. Harry
Blackmun is almost as quiet; his frequent yawns --
great, languorous yawns that cause every feature on
his face to recede into invisibility -- have become the
stuff of legend.
The chatterboxes are justices Souter and
Scalia. Souter's face is long and drawn, Scalia's
round and puckish. Both have 5 o'clock shadows,
and side by side they look like the bad guys in a
Dick Tracy cartoon. Scalia's manner is ferocious. He
seems the sort of fellow who would snap "Buy a
paper!" if you asked him for a football score. He
commonly begins a question with the pitiless
formulation: "You aren't really trying to argue that
Souter, with his courtly New Hampshire
manner and accent to match -- "lawr" for law,
"ahgument" for argument -- is more decorous but
less intelligible. He favors colloquialisms that can
only confuse the attorneys before him: "I see you've
put all your eggs in the warrant basket," he told one
lawyer. "You're now in the non-negotiable driver's
seat," he knowingly told another, who looked as
though he'd never dreamed he was in any such
place.
To this short list of talkers, we may now add
Justice Ginsburg. In a speech this summer, she
warned of her fondness for questions. "I will have to
be more restrained," she promised, "I'll have to do
some self-censorship." Too late. She censored
herself for precisely 9 minutes in her debut, then
uncorked 17 questions, many of them lengthy, in the
next 51 minutes, for an average of one every 180
seconds -- impressive considering that there were at
least seven other justices trying to get a word in
edgewise.
Souter's dithering, Scalia's law-professor
peevishness, and Ginsburg's motor-mouth peppering
combine to create a fearsome fusillade. Lawyers
have been known to wither -- even those who
prepare several hundred hours for just this moment,
as most do. A lawyer is lucky to get an
uninterrupted minute before a justice prods him for
clarification or amplification. Thereafter he answers
questions without letup. Seeing one of these poor
fellows melt before the bench in a heap of
humiliation can be a painful experience -- until you
remember he's a lawyer.
IN THEORY an oral argument sounds like
a dramatic occasion, but for the layman it's more
like a foreign movie without subtitles. The
participants speak in a language unknown to ordinary
Americans -- the code of a cult, crafted over
centuries to obscure the obvious and thereby
preserve the exclusivity of the legal profession and
guarantee its enormous fees. After awhile it all
begins to take on a dreamlike quality:
JUSTICE GINSBURG (intensely): Would
any cognizable analogue to the Croson test
still have a demonstrable impact on the
federal fise?
LAWYER: Well, Your Honor, the scope of
remedies available is incorporated, if only
by inference, into the de jure duplicative
burdens that fall on respondent.
JUSTICE SOUTER (airily): But -- hmmm --
if you've met those Jingles preconditions --
maybe I'm wrong -- while ignoring your
own Zimmer affirmations, then you've only
proved cohesion and not compactness.
Haven't you? Or am I wrong?
LAWYER: I agree, Your Honor. The
vacature case depends on whether a
non-mutual collateral estoppel is adduceable
from the retroactivity claim.
JUSTICE SCALIA (peeved): You're joking!
How do you apply a GELA remedy if those
conditions obtain? You act as if this is a
maximilization case!!
For all the spectators know, by the time
everybody's through the justices have made Urdu
circumcision rites mandatory in public schools.
When you watch the Supreme Court, much has to be
taken on faith. This is by design. Like a
filibustering senator, the justices have learned the
tactical uses of boredom.
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Sooner or later, in every book written about
the Supreme Court, you come across a quote from
Alexander Hamilton: The Court, he said, is "the
least dangerous branch of government." Lawyers
press the theme in articles for the popular press:
"The Least Dangerous Branch: Nothing to Worry
About." "It's No Big Deal, Honest: Reflections on
Hamilton's 'Least Dangerous Branch."' And so on.
But lawyers are as contentious as they are sneaky.
When they all start assuring us of the same thing,
we're entitled to grow suspicious.
Though it nurtures an image of
otherworldliness, the Supreme Court is a Washington
political institution, smaller and less bureaucratic
than most but sharing with all such institutions a
thirst for aggrandizement and power.
It was not always so. In the beginning, the
justices resembled a band of itincrants. They rode
circuit in fall, winter, and spring, visited Washington
for two sessions of two or three weeks' duration in
August and February, and retired to their homes for
the balance of the year.
For most of the court's life, it even lacked
its own building. The justices were shunted from
room to room in the Capitol and even met
occasionally in a friendly tavern. They seemed not to
mind. When Congress, in 1896, offered to move
them to a permanent court in the newly completed
Library of Congress building, they unanimously
rejected the invitation.
Then came Chief Justice (and former
president) William Howard Taft, whose conception
of the court's grandeur and importance was as vast
as . . . William Howard Taft. The pompous temple
on First Street was his idea, though its construction
proceeded under his successor, Charles Evans
Hughes. The court took up residence there in 1935.
When the sculptor Robert Aitken was commissioned
to design the frieze above the entryway, he made
sure its giant, mythic figures bore the likenesses of
Hughes, the architect Cass Gilbert (who had hired
him), and himself. As it turns out, they all look like
Hulk Hogan. But it was a fittingly vain gesture for
a building that is, at bottom, a monument to
institutional vanity.
The Court's intellectual history shows the
same relentless aggrandizement. Spending so much
time on a set from Samson and Delilah, the justices
begin to think of themselves as Victor Mature (or
Hedy Lamarr).
For most of this century, the court has
removed ever larger areas of American life from the
discretion of elected representatives and the public,
substituting its own preferences for theirs. As former
politicians, justices cannot resist the temptation to
make policy.
The most obvious examples came in the
1950s and '60s. The Warren Court's hunger for
power was breathtaking. It refashioned American
culture according to the whims of its justices, and in
ways that no elected representative, having to face
the electorate, would dare propose. Some of these
were changes for the better, some weren't; but
whether the court -- unelected, unaccountable, and
irreversible -- had the right to make them was highly
dubious.
The justices redrafted welfare-eligibility
requirements, redrew congressional districts, rewrote
the lesson plans of public-school teachers. And
much, much else. They took care to swaddle their
power grabs in constitutional finery, discovering
rationales in the founding document's unwritten
"spirit" or "evolution," the details of which seemed
discernible only to those blessed with a law degree.
The Rehnquist Court is slightly more
modest. It makes the most of the boredom it induces
in laymen, usually avoiding a sweeping Warren-like
decision in favor of incremental reform. But it, too,
fiddles with any public policy it wants, from the
shape of congressional districts to smoking
restrictions in penitentiaries.
In the words of one scholar, "its reaction to
nearly any problem is to enhance its own policy
discretion . . . case by case to achieve what it
believes to be desirable social results." Achieving
"desirable social results," of course, is supposed to
be the business of elected representatives. If they
achieve an undesirable social result, we can vote
them out of office. That's democracy. But we can't
get rid of Supreme Court justices. The constitution
grants them life tenure -- one of the few
constitutional provisions they take literally.
It is a dilemma as old as democracy itself:
What to do when a branch of government runs
amok? Normally the press acts as a check on the
power-crazed. Not in this instance. Perhaps reporters
are blinded by the court's hauteur, or thrilled by its
spirit of social reform; perhaps the unceasing
boredom has done them in. Whatever the reason,
Supreme Court reporters are remarkably uncritical
when the justices grab more power. And any
relinquishing of power, conversely, is condemned as
an abdication of responsibility.
Two cases illustrate the tendency. In 1992
the court ruled that the beating of a prisoner by
guards violated the constitution's stricture against
"cruel and unusual punishment." Justice Thomas
dissented. He noted that the beating was
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contemptible but pointed out that there were other
legal remedies available, civil and criminal. The case
did not raise a constitutional question, in Thomas's
view, and thus was beyond the court's jurisdiction.
The majority ruling, he wrote, "was yet another
manifestation of the pervasive view that the Federal
Constitution" -- hence the court -- "must address all
ills in our society."
Right or wrong, the intellectual distinction
Thomas drew wasn't hard to comprehend. It was a
rare decision -a justice admitting that the court could
not assume control of every social question by
claiming a constitutional prerogative. Press accounts
suggested that Thomas was now in favor of beating
convicts. For this the New York Times called him
"the youngest, cruelest Justice."
Thomas may yet learn from Anthony
Kennedy, whom the press hailed a year later for his
very different kind of decision in Lee v. Weisman.
In it the court ruled that non-sectarian prayers would
be banned from public-school graduation ceremonies.
Lee was a classic court power grab: From its temple
in Washington it reached uninvited into every high
school gym and assembly hall in America and
wagged its big finger like a two-by-four. Why?
Kennedy offered an almost untraceable line of
constitutional and psychological reasoning, which
culminated in the unspoken words: Because I say so.
It mattered not at all that the court itself
opens with a kind of prayer, beseeching God to save
it. Or that Congress does the same thing. Justice
Kennedy had torn off the straitjacket of judicial
restraint, and Legal Times praised his newly
discovered "hankering to be fair."
Of course, reporters do not react to the
Supreme Court with identical biases: if they did,
readers might find their stories easier to follow.
When last year's term drew to a close, several
newspapers surveyed the court's decisions. HIGH
COURT'S TERM SHOWS NO DRIFT TO
CENTER, headlined the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
FOR HIGH COURT, A TERM OF MOVING TO
MIDDLE, responded USA Today. And the New
York Times had it both ways: COURT'S
COUNTERREVOLUTION COMES IN FITS AND
STARTS. If the press can't control the court, who
will? Reformers have suggested opening up its
processes to public scrutiny. They point to Congress,
with its C-SPAN-monitored deliberations, as an
exemplar. The idea should give pause. Congress is
in many ways a model of openness, but at a cost.
You have only to see Bob Dorman bellowing before
the cameras on the floor of the House, or watch
congressmen prostrate themselves before a piece of
sitcom cheesecake testifying on the destruction of the
rainforest, to measure the price of openness. A
showboating congressman is just an annoyance; a
showboating justice can be dangerous.
In fact, the Supreme Court cocoon is quite
permeable as it is. One former Supreme Court clerk
speaks of the concentric circles that surround the
court. The inner circle is the court itself, peopled
exclusively by lawyers. Every term a justice hires
four clerks (Stevens makes do with three) to research
cases and draft opinions. The clerks are freshly
graduated from the nation's top law schools, where,
following the fashions of law professors, they have
learned that justices are most ennobled when they
take up the work of social reform that the lumbering
public ignores.
Their power is by all accounts enormous.
Although gossip routinely circulates about the
influence of one clerk or another on individual
justices, it is hard to know which stories to credit,
since most of them originate with the clerks
themselves. But clerks do decide, with minimal
supervision, which cases the justices will hear among
the thousands of petitions they receive. As a result,
the court's docket fills with flashy cases involving
sexual harassment, pornography, and racial
discrimination, while less colorful, though arguably
more consequential issues in antitrust or trademark
law go unheard. Few of the clerks have yet practiced
law or even slaved at a real job, where they might
learn the complications of workaday life. They thus
bring to the court the grad student's air of
intellectualism and the twentysomething's taste for
remaking the world. Neither trait is appropriate for
the court of last appeal, but both influence its
opinions.
Beyond this circle is the press. Their
constant goading to judicial activism rivals that of
the clerks, and has similar if less direct effects -- at
least one justice, Anthony Kennedy, reportedly has
his clerks keep a scrapbook of his press clippings.
Then there is official Washington. The
obsessions with politics and policy, celebrity and
gossip, the imperiousness and elitism that detach
Washington from the rest of the country become the
ether in which the justices live and breathe. Though
unrecognizable to most Americans, they are
transformed by Washington alchemy into local
celebrities. Dinner with Kay Graham, drinks with
George Mitchell, racquetball with Ted Koppel: It is
a long, inexorable seduction, an endless process of
self-inflation, for which we all pay the price in the
end.
One modest proposal suggests removing
them from the Washington swamp altogether, by
transplanting the Court -- justices and clerks, law
books and Xerox machines, the works -- to Kansas
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City, say, or Billings, Montana, where they might
reestablish contact with the public whose desires they
routinely second-guess or override. The Supreme
Court building itself could stand empty for awhile, as
a kind of monument to the perils of overweening
government, and then be handed over to a local high
school for basketball games.
But this proposal, while sound, is probably
unworkable. The only antidote to a power-hungry
Supreme Court, if there is one, will come from a
different kind of justice -- secure enough in his
beliefs to resist the lure of Washington elitism,
respectful enough of democratic process to keep her
hands to herself.
Such justices would be even more
nondescript than the ones we have, and the Supreme
Court, having relinquished its self-imposed role as
policy-maker, would become even more boring than
it is. It would risk forgoing its status as "one of the
best tourist sights in Washington," but no great loss:
If the tourists wanted to see where policy is made,
they could cross the street and watch congressmen
bellow on the floor of the House -- undignified and
earthy, lacking robes and brocade, a spectacle, for
better or worse, of democracy revived.
Reprinted with the permission of The
Washingtonian.
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IF THERE IS BLOOD ON AN OPINION, WE KNOW WHO WROTE IT
The Supreme Court Justices (And Their Clerks) Stamp Prose With Quirky Flair
The Wall Street Journal
Copyright (c) 1993, Dow Jones & Co., Inc.
Monday, October 4, 1993
Paul M. Barrett, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal
WASHINGTON -- Supreme Court justices
-- and their clerks -- sometimes write the darnedest
things.
If a Supreme Court opinion is laden with
antiquated words, it's a safe bet it came from Justice
David Souter's chambers. After a lawyer used the
obsolete noun "aught," meaning "anything" or "all,"
in an oral argument last term, Justice Antonin Scalia
offered Justice Souter $2 if he could work it into an
opinion.
"For aught we can see . . .," Justice Souter
stated in a case involving an American citizen's right
to sue a foreign country. He collected his money --
though perhaps he should have shared the bounty
with his law clerk. In truth, the clerk cranked out the
rough draft of the opinion, with Mr. Souter editing
in his personal flourishes.
Louis Brandeis, who served on the high
court from 1916 to 1939, quipped that the justices
are about the only people in Washington who "do
their own work." In reality, most court members
these days edit their law clerks' work, content to
insert their own little touches while assuring that the
opinions accurately reflect their views on the issues.
No member of the court, which opens its fall
term today, uses the facts of a crime more
graphically to make his point than Chief Justice
William Rehnquist. In a 1991 opinion upholding a
death sentence, he described a fleeing murderer as
"sweating blood," noting that the victim's wounds
were "caused by 41 separate thrusts of a butcher
knife." If an opinion scoffs that opposing viewpoints
"cannot possibly be taken seriously," it's likely that
it came from Justice Scalia, the court's king of
sarcasm. Sentimentality, on the other hand, is Justice
Harry Blackmun's specialty: "Poor Joshua!" he
exclaimed in a dissent from a 1989 ruling that went
against a child-beating victim.
Only Justice John Paul Stevens, at age 73
the court's second-oldest member, regularly
composes his own first drafts of opinions. His
approach couldn't be called old-fashioned, though. A
tennis fanatic, he often writes his opinions on a word
processor at his Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., condo, and
then faxes them to the court.
Justice Souter joined the court in 1990 also
determined to do his own writing. His hero, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, dispatched decisions in a pithy few
pages. But Justice Souter immediately fell behind and
now only occasionally takes up pen and yellow legal
pad to compose an opinion from scratch.
In fairness, the court faces increasingly
complex legal issues while juggling an ever-growing
body of precedents and statutes. To research and
help write the opinions, most justices employ four
clerks for one-year terms. Owing to court secrecy,
the public hears little of the clerks, who typically are
recent law-school honors graduates.
Eager to prove their mettle, these young
lawyers often produce Promethean recitations of
court precedent, bundled together with relevant
public documents -- wordy excerpts from
congressional committee reports, for example.
Some critics contend that too often the
justices edit too lightly, letting lengthy passages of
clerk-speak slide into the official law books. "It's not
just that it offends aesthetic sensibilities," says Bryan
Garner, a Dallas legal lexicographer and writing
consultant. "The words of the Supreme Court have
a significance unlike almost any other words."
Justice Scalia, who argues that explorations
of "legislative history" are usually contradictory and
irrelevant to court decisions, tried to prove his point
by presenting a healthy dose of the stuff in an
opinion last March on tax breaks for soldiers. With
frankness rarely found in high court
pronouncements, he conceded that the material had
actually been cobbled together by the "hapless law
clerk to whom I assigned the task."
The process can create the illusion that the
brainy clerks, not the justices, are deciding cases.
Puffed-up former law clerks contribute to the false
perception. Some court veterans tell the story of the
time the late Justice Thurgood Marshall made only
a single change in a clerk's draft. The first sentence
read, "We took this case to consider . . ." Justice
Marshall crossed out "consider," telling his clerk, "I
take cases to decide them." (And he did make the
ultimate decisions, even in his last frail years.)
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Marshall crossed out "consider," telling his clerk, "I
take cases to decide them." (And he did make the
ultimate decisions, even in his last frail years.)
Among current justices, there is a spectrum
of opinion-generating techniques. Justices Scalia and
Souter edit and rewrite substantially. Justice Stevens,
while writing his own opinions, does permit his
clerks to handle footnotes. This results in some of
the most arcane marginalia in lawyerdom. In a
Stevens majority opinion last June upholding the
tough U.S. policy on Haitian refugees, footnote No.
37 (out of 44) offered a 23-line meditation on the
verb "return," and its French cousins.
Justices Blackmun, Sandra Day O'Connor
and Clarence Thomas mainly edit. Justice Thomas,
for example, got the headlines for his most
controversial opinion: a fiery February 1992 dissent
asserting that beating a prisoner isn't "cruel and
unusual" punishment unless guards inflict a "serious"
injury. But the person who actually wrote most of
the dissent was Christopher Landau, then a
28-year-old Thomas law clerk.
This sort of ghostwriting has caused critics
to whisper about Justice Thomas being a puppet of
conservative clerks, who, in turn, are under the spell
of Justice Scalia. But while Justice Thomas has
shown a strong affinity for Justice Scalia's thinking,
he calls his own shots.
In the prisoner-beating case, Justice Scalia
actually thought the Thomas dissent was too
extreme, but reluctantly signed it anyway to try to
shield his then-rookie ally from criticism. (Mr.
Landau declines comment.)
Chief Justice Rehnquist gives his clerks only
10 days to submit drafts, then pares them to a
minimum. Unpretentious about his august role, the
chief has said that he does some of his best thinking
while shaving in the morning. He rewrites by
dictation, producing opinions that are short if
sometimes cryptic.
The newest justice, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, is
expected to fit somewhere in the middle of all this.
While serving as a Washington federal appeals court
judge, she said of her clerks: "I encourage their
comments and attempts to influence or change my
mind."
Justice Blackmun breakfasts with his clerks
in the high court's public cafeteria, but when it
comes to business, he communicates almost entirely
on paper. Like his clerks' memos, which run to 60
single-spaced pages -- "We're showing how smart
we are," admits one Blackmun alumna -- Blackmun
opinions tend to sprawl a bit.
The court's oldest member, 84-year-old
Justice Blackmun is the only justice who
double-checks by hand every citation and quotation
in his opinions. In 1990, his clerks pointed out that
a new computer program could do the drudge work
automatically. He just "shook his head and walked
away," says a former clerk who was there.
Reprinted by permission THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL o 1994 Dow Jones & Co., Inc. All
rights reserved.
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JUSTICES FOLLOW A MOSTLY CONSERVATIVE COURSE
Kennedy Assuming Pivotal Role on a Supreme Court
That Continues to Redefine Itself
Copyright 1994 The Washington Post
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Lawyers arguing cases in the Supreme
Court's grand, marble-columned courtroom last term
were drawn to the right side of the bench, where the
most vocal justices, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Antonin
Scalia and David H. Souter, sat together.
But the critical vote came from the other
side.
As the court term ended last week, it was
clear that Anthony M. Kennedy, a Ronald Reagan
appointee, was decisive in the closest, most
controversial cases. His vote kept the court on a
mostly conservative track, culminating in a 5 to 4
opinion giving new constitutional protection to
property owners in the face of government regulation
on development of their land. The majority said
property ownership should be as protected as free
speech and family privacy.
Meanwhile, Ginsburg, President Clinton's
appointee and the first Democratic justice in 26
years, positioned herself only slightly to the
ideological left of center of the court.
Souter, President George Bush's 1990
appointee, voted more with the court's liberal wing
(Harry A. Blackmun and John Paul Stevens) than did
Ginsburg. Each year Souter separates himself more
from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and
increasingly has taken on the intellectual powerhouse
of the right wing, Scalia. Last week, Souter scoffed
at a Scalia opinion, calling it "the work of a
gladiator, but he thrusts at lions of his own
imagining."
This term also will be remembered as
Blackmun's last. The 85-year-old justice, the court's
liberal pole, was in the majority least this term. He
managed to pull out a final victory (with Kennedy's
vote) on the last day to ensure that federal judges can
stop the execution of a state prisoner so the inmate
can get help filing an appeal. Earlier this year,
Blackmun denounced capital punishment, saying he
no longer would "tinker with the machinery of
death."
In a number of key cases, Blackmun,
Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg joined together. But
except when they picked up fifth-vote Kennedy, they
were relegated to the dissent.
Kennedy broke with conservatives to rule
that criminal suspects must be given a hearing before
U.S. marshals can seize their property. "Although
Congress designed the drug forfeiture statute to be a
powerful instrument of the drug laws, " Kennedy
wrote, "it did not intend to deprive innocent owners
of their property."
Kennedy also was the fifth vote to strike
down a state tax on marijuana when levied against
people already convicted of drug crimes. The court
said that violated the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy.
Yet Kennedy, a pragmatist who goes
case-by-case, was more likely to give conservatives
the win, as when he ruled that lawyers and
accountants who may have aided in securities fraud
cannot be sued by investors. Rejecting decades of
lower court rulings to the contrary, Kennedy said
Congress did not clearly write such liability into law.
All told, the ideological spectrum of the
1993-94 court appeared this way: from conservative
to liberal, Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Rehnquist,
Sandra Day O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Souter,
Stevens and Blackmun.
"It's nice to see the dance cards shifting a
little," University of Chicago law professor Michael
W. McConnell said of the justices' alliances. "I think
this is better than [in the late 1980s] when you had
a well-defined conservative bloc and a well-defined
liberal bloc" at loggerheads.
Generally speaking, a "conservative" justice
believes that the courts should not become involved
in social problems that are the domain of elected
legislators. Conservatism also suggests a tendency
toward social conservatism, such as support for the
death penalty and opposition to abortion. Judicial
"liberals" go the opposite way and are more apt to
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broadly interpret the Constitution irrespective of the
will of legislatures.
The current court defies real labeling
because it keeps changing. Kennedy came on the
bench in 1988, Souter in 1990, Thomas in 1991 and
Ginsburg in 1993. A single new justice alters the
dynamic among all the justices, changing the
tug-and-pull on difficult issues.
Stephen G. Breyer, the federal appellate
judge whom Clinton has nominated to replace
Blackmun, is himself a pragmatic centrist. His
confirmation hearings begin July 12.
Harvard law professor Laurence H. Tribe,
who says the court is in "disarray," predicts that
Breyer would be a steady hand and voice of clarity.
Tribe, a longtime friend and colleague of Breyer,
said the former professor and Judiciary Committee
counsel would be able to build a clearer consensus
among the justices. Breyer has a reputation for being
able to get to the heart of a dispute, no matter how
complex, and bring people at the extremes together.
What that will do for the direction of the law
is uncertain. Breyer's opinions during the past 14
years as a federal appellate judge in Boston
emphasize rules and balancing tests rather than
ideology.
Not everyone can crowd in the center, and
the combination of a Breyer appointment and more
tenure for Souter and Ginsburg could bring new
definition to the liberal side. Stevens will be the most
senior of the liberal-leaning justices, but his legal
reasoning is often idiosyncratic.
For the just-completed term, a lack of an
overarching court philosophy, combined with the
court's general inclination to hear fewer cases (the
fewest in three decades), led to few groundbreaking
rulings. The justices handed down 84 signed
opinions; by comparison, in the 1980s, the court
averaged 140 opinions each term.
The court, expanding on prohibitions against
race discrimination in jury selection, ruled for the
first time that lawyers could not eliminate people
from a jury pool based on their sex and stereotypes
about how men and women decide cases.
In an affirmation of separation between
church and state, the court said that the New York
legislature went too far beyond the "neutrality" that
government must show religion when it created a
special school district for the disabled children of an
Orthodox Jewish village.
The high court also said, with consequences
for the "Information Superhighway," that cable
television operators and other wire-based electronic
communications are entitled to more free speech
protection than television and radio broadcasters,
who operate on scarce airwaves. Also of interest to
business, the court ruled that judges must be able to
reduce excessive jury awards in personal injury cases
and said a major anti-job-discrimination law did not
apply to cases that were pending before the law was
adopted in November 1991.
But it ruled unanimously that a worker who
claims she was sexually harassed need not show
psychological injury to win her case. The court
defined unlawful harassment as creating a work
environment that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive. In that early case, Ginsburg
showed that she would be as blunt in opinions as she
was on the bench: "The critical issue," she said in a
concurring statement, "is whether members of one
sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which members of the
other sex are not exposed."
Big winners this term were Mark Russell,
the Capitol Steps and others who make their living
by setting political criticism to well-known melodies.
In a case involving a 2 Live Crew rap version of the
rock hit, "Oh, Pretty Woman," the court said parody
can be exempted from copyright law.
One of the more high-profile losers was Sen.
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), who has been crusading to
keep open the 193-year-old Naval Shipyard in
Philadelphia. The justices were unanimous in ruling
that courts may not intervene in the politically
sensitive process by which the president and a
special commission have decided which unnecessary
bases to close.
In a brief exchange of remarks between
Rehnquist and Blackmun last Thursday, Blackmun's
last day on the bench, the retiring justice noted the
"weight" that this one "small organization" carries.
"Let us hope that, in the years far down the
line, when history eventually places us in such
perspective as we deserve, it at least will be able to
say: 'They did their best and did acceptably well."'
a 1994. The Washington Post. Reprinted with
permission.
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EMERGING AS THE LIBERAL LEADER
The Call's in Souter's Court
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Supreme Court Justice David H. Souter,
nearing the end of his court opinion that struck down
a New York law carving out a separate school
district for the Hasidic sect of Judaism, paused to
reply to a ferocious dissent filed by his more
conservative colleague, Antonin Scalia.
"Justice Cardozo once cast the dissenter as
the gladiator making a last stand against the lions.
Justice Scalia's dissent is certainly the work of a
gladiator, but he thrusts at lions of his own
imagining," Souter said dryly.
It may be hard to imagine the soft-spoken
New Hampshire jurist as a lion-tamer, but perhaps
the most significant trend in the court term that
ended last week was Souter's rise to challenge the
hard-charging conservatives on his right and his
success in pushing them aside in most of the key
cases.
The result was a court increasingly likely to
fashion moderate-to-liberal rulings, with Souter
quietly emerging as its new leader.
Lawyers on both sides of the ideological
spectrum point to Souter as a growing force, a
surprise for a little-known judge who was derided as
the "stealth candidate" when President George Bush
selected him in 1990.
"Souter is emerging as the liberal leader in
the post-Blackmun era," said Clint Bolick, counsel to
the conservative Institute of Justice.
"His stature, competence, and confidence
seem to grow from term to term. He is becoming a
real leader," said Steven R. Shapiro, national legal
director for the American Civil Liberties Union.
Thanks in large part to Souter, the just-completed
term was a "surprisingly successful" one for civil
liberties, Shapiro said.
In the term that ended Thursday, the justices
interpreted the Constitution to say that religious
groups may not be given political power, that
potential jurors may be not be excluded because of
their gender, that the government cannot seize a
home in a drug case without a hearing, that cities
cannot bar a homeowner's display of a protest sign,
and that prison officials can be forced to pay
damages if they deliberately ignore a clear risk to the
health of their inmates.
In cases involving federal laws, the justices
made it easier for victims of sexual harassment to
win damages from their employers, said abortion
protesters who use violence can be sued under the
anti-racketeering law, and ruled that the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 does not apply to cases that were
pending before it was enacted.
For conservatives, the biggest victories came
in the area of property rights. The Constitution does
not allow officials to demand a piece of property in
exchange for a building permit, the court said on a
5-4 vote, unless they can prove this exaction is
closely linked to the burden imposed by the
expanded development. In addition, the court insisted
that state judges examine a jury's punitive damage
verdict to make sure the amount is not excessive.
Souter's growing strength may be especially
important as the court undergoes transition.
Thursday marked the last day for 85-year-old Justice
Harry A. Blackmun, who retired after 24 years on
the high court.
If all goes as expected, he will be replaced
in October by President Clinton's second nominee,
Judge Stephen Breyer of Boston. In May, White
House counsel Lloyd Cutler boasted that Breyer had
the experience and skill to be a coalition-builder on
the high court. But privately, some administration
attorneys admit that Souter is likely to be a stronger,
more effective voice on behalf of civil rights and
individual liberties.
In her first term, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg followed a moderate-to-liberal approach
similar to Souter's. With Breyer and veteran John
Paul Stevens, the four could form a solid coalition.
Just a few years ago, it looked as though the
rapid succession of new conservative appointees
could push the law sharply to the right.
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Presidents Reagan and Bush said they
wanted to see the court reject the right to abortion,
permit prayer in schools, and cut back on the rights
of criminal defendants. In William H. Rehnquist,
they had a chief justice committed to those goals.
But several Reagan-Bush appointees have
disappointed conservatives, Souter in particular and
Anthony M. Kennedy to some degree. In June 1992,
they stunned their conservative colleagues by joining
with Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to strongly
reaffirm the Roe vs. Wade ruling and to strike down
a public school graduation prayer which was led by
a cleric.
Since then, the court has steered a mostly
centrist course, if anything moving slightly left.
More often than not, the strict conservatives, Scalia,
Rehnquist, and Clarence Thomas, find themselves in
dissent.
There are no sound bites in a typical Souter
opinion. He can be a turgid writer, and sometimes
both sides claim victory after reading his decision.
But his careful approach also draws the
support and respect of his fellow justices.
At 55, Souter is just coming into his prime
years on the Supreme Court. But already, he has
proven to be far more than first advertised.
Said Carter Phillips, a Washington attorney
who practices before the court: "This was a guy who
came in as an unknown from nowhere. But
ultimately, I think he will prove to be the most
important one up there."
Reprinted with the permission of The L.A. 71mes.
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SOUTER'S DECISIONS SHOW LIBERAL TREND
Bush Appointee Dismays Conservatives
Copyright 1994 News World Communications, Inc.
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Nancy E. Roman; The Washington Times
The Supreme Court term that just ended,
which produced 82 opinions, revealed a liberal
streak in Justice David Souter.
Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion
striking down a special school district created for
disabled Hasidic Jews, holding the line on separation
of church and state.
And he voted with the five-justice majority
that overturned the death sentence of a confessed
murderer-rapist on the grounds that the jury did not
have full sentencing information. Jurors were not
told he could be sentenced to life in prison without
parole.
Bruce Shapiro, head of Supreme Court
Watch, a civil rights watchdog group, praised Justice
Souter's role in making it easier to review death
sentences. "A development that is not a surprise, but
that is historically important, is Souter's emergence
as a voice in civil rights."
Thomas Jipping, director for the Center of
Law and Democracy at the Free Congress
Foundation, said conservatives are dismayed at the
record of the George Bush appointee.
"John Sununu told me directly that Souter
would be a 'home run for conservatives,' " Mr.
Jipping recalled. "The first term, I thought he might
be a blooper single. After last year I thought he was
a foul ball. Now I think he's a strikeout." He said
Justice Souter often joins Justices Harry A.
Blackmun, John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg in dissenting. Last week he dissented from
a major victory for property rights advocates.
The court ruled 5-4 that government may not
make building permits contingent upon property
improvements unless it shows a direct link between
the two. They sided with an Oregon woman who was
required to build a bike path and to donate property
for a public greenway in order to expand her
plumbing store.
Justice Stevens wrote a dissent joined by
Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg. Justice Souter
dissented separately, saying "the common zoning
regulations requiring subdividers to . . . dedicate
certain areas to public streets are in accord with our
constitutional traditions because the proposed
property use would otherwise be the cause of
excessive congestion."
In the 1992 term he upheld a fundamental
right to abortion. His 1993 decisions showed that he:
* Is uncomfortable with the death penalty
and ready to overturn it on almost any procedural
grounds.
* Favors the use of an anti-discrimination
law to sue abortion-clinic blockaders in federal
court.
* Is against state provision of a
sign-language interpreter for a deaf student who
elected to attend Catholic school.
* Espouses congressional districts designed
to elect blacks to Congress. The majority said such
oddly shaped districts drawn solely on the basis of
race were unconstitutional. But Justice Souter was
among four dissenters who said the creation of such
districts was permissible to remedy violations of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.
On Thursday, Justice Souter dissented in a
voting rights case in Georgia. The court ruled, 5-4,
that black voters could not challenge a
single-commissioner government under the Voting
Rights Act, even though they made up 20 percent of
the voting population but never elected a black
commissioner.
Once again, the dissenters were Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, Blackmun and Stevens.
Constitutional scholar Bruce Fein said
Justice Souter most resembles Justice Ginsburg in
both style and substance.
"Souter clearly falls into the liberal liturgy
of the court," he said. "He's not quite as extravagant
as Harry Blackmun - he's like Ginsburg."
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Justice Ginsburg, who served her first term
on the court this year after being appointed by
President Clinton, generally takes a liberal view of
the Constitution but joins with conservatives in
chiding Congress for drafting sloppy laws.
History has shown that justices often
disappoint the presidents who put them on the court.
For example, Justice Blackmun, the court's most
noted liberal and the author of Roe vs. Wade, was
appointed by President Nixon. Justice Byron White,
who often joined the court's conservatives, was
appointed by President Kennedy.
Mr. Jipping said Justice Souter's alliance
with Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Ginsburg
creates a liberal bloc only one vote short of a
majority.
However, that may change as Justice
Blackmun steps down and Stephen Breyer joins the
court.
Judge Breyer, expected to win easy
confirmation this month, is conservative on economic
issues and might side with the five-justice majority in
cases that ask when government regulation or
requirements constitute a "taking" of property under
the Fifth Amendment.
It remains to be seen where he stands on the
Establishment Clause, the death penalty and
homosexual rights - key areas that come before the
court.
Reprinted from The Washington Times.
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THOMAS
The High Court's Contrarian
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Show Supreme Court Justice Clarence
Thomas the expected path, and he'll walk the other
way.
Tell him justices should steer clear of
controversial figures, and Thomas will host
conservative talk show host Rush Limbaugh's
wedding, as he did last month.
Tell him he'd be wise to cozy up to the
media establishment, and Thomas will state, as he
did to a book author recently, that The Washington
Post and The New York Times "can say absolutely
anything they want about me. I will never read them
again to see it."
Tell him to take up the late Thurgood
Marshall's liberal mantle, and he'll speak out against
prisoners' rights, as he did in a ruling just three
weeks ago. Brutality in prisons, he shrugged, is
inevitable: "Prisons are necessarily dangerous
places."
It has been nearly three years since Thomas,
46, burst onto the national scene with confirmation
hearings that featured sensational sexual harassment
charges by former employee Anita Hill.
Since then, Thomas has stayed largely out of
the public eye. He almost never speaks from the
bench. He sometimes goes weeks without seeing
another justice. And, after work he almost always
retreats to his suburban home with his wife and best
friend, Virginia Lamp Thomas.
But in rare public sightings - often before
conservative groups that supported him - Thomas has
charted a distinctive course, like no other justice in
recent memory.
Some say his solitary journey is a
thumb-in-your-eye campaign to avenge the
confirmation ordeal he faced at age 43. That theory
is fueled by a comment he has made more than once:
"The next 43 years will be my answer to what
happened."
The Rev. Jesse Jackson criticized Thomas'
hosting of Limbaugh's wedding as "a contemptuous,
in-your-face political act, quite improper in the
political sense."
Jackson also said Thomas' rulings have been
"quite blatant in their contempt for our progress,
even though he's been a prime beneficiary of the
civil rights struggle."
But others see Thomas' path in less
confrontational terms. He is a private man, friends
say, who was overwhelmed by sudden notoriety, and
still is regaining his composure.
Hosting and presiding at Limbaugh's
wedding, they say, is a symbol of Thomas' loyalty,
not his politics. Limbaugh supported him early and
often in the face of Hill's charges, and they became
close.
"With Justice Thomas, friendships are
unconditional," says longtime friend Armstrong
Williams, publisher of The Right Side newsletter and
a radio talk-show host. "You tell him you need him
and he'll be there."
But more than loyalty is at work in Thomas'
approach to life and work.
In many of his public talks, Thomas conveys
a view of the world borrowed from the Catholic
seminaries he attended for four years: Life is a test,
a burden, full of obligations and trials that must be
dealt with alone.
"The dirty little secret of freedom is that you
are on your own," he told an Ohio university
audience in April. "It certainly is more attractive to
expect nothing from a person and never hold him
accountable. But nature is far more exacting than
that."
He also tells of his grandfather's admonition:
"If you make your bed hard, you lay in it hard."
Thomas says he never quite understood what that
meant literally, but the message was clear: Don't
blame anyone else for the messes you find yourself
in.
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That doesn't mean Thomas holds himself
responsible for the Anita Hill debacle. He still views
that as the modern equivalent of a lynching.
But it does mean that in putting the Hill
episode behind him, Thomas seeks neither
forgiveness nor approval from Washington's elite.
"When we demand something from our
oppressors - more lenient standards of conduct, for
example - are we going from a state of slavery to a
more deceptive, but equally destructive state of
dependency?" Thomas told a Federalist Society
audience last month.
"Learning the lessons that we must learn
cannot forever be avoided by sweeping our
difficulties under the rug of societal blame," Thomas
said at Mercer University last year.
In that world view, minorities deserve no
special favors, and no one - not pregnant women,
not death row inmates - deserves a whit more
protection from the Constitution than it explicitly
gives.
Only once has Thomas expressed regret that,
in his view, the Constitution sharply limits his ability
as a judge to right the wrongs of society.
In the Ohio speech in April, he said his
votes often run counter to his own sympathies. "It
tears at you. It's like watching someone drown."
That regret comes as a surprise to some
court-watchers, who cite the unsympathetic tone in
his opinions.
Two years ago, Thomas declared in a dissent
that when guards beat a prisoner, they are not
violating the constitutional ban on "cruel and unusual
punishment" because "judges or juries - but not
jailers - impose 'punishment.' "
That dissent and others earned Thomas
widespread criticism. Emerge magazine depicted him
as a "handkerchief head" - a derisive term to
describe subservient blacks.
None of that has silenced Thomas: Earlier
this month, he went out of his way in another prison
case to repeat his views on punishment.
Thomas votes almost all the time with
conservative Justice Antonin Scalia - a higher affinity
than any two other justices, a Howard University
Law Review study found.
But it still is difficult to gauge his views on
some major legal issues. The opinions Thomas has
been assigned to write, mainly by the chief justice,
have usually been technical, exploring the far
corners of bankruptcy, commercial law or the like.
That could change this week.
Before the court adjourns for the summer, it
is expected to hand down a half-dozen or more
decisions with headline-making potential, and
Thomas could author some.
And Clarence Thomas may be loosening up.
He is just now beginning to laugh at himself in
public, joking about his efforts to keep his weight
down, and telling audiences what his brother told
him when he first became a judge: "They finally
figured out a way to shut you up."
Within the marble walls of the court,
Thomas is friendly and accessible to court
employees, especially his law clerks.
In fact, Thomas already has started an
annual tradition and a contrary one at that.
When the clerks of other justices hold yearly
reunions, some are fairly formal, even black-tie
affairs.
When Thomas' current clerks get together in
September, it is expected to take the same form as
last year's: a cookout in Thomas' backyard.
Copyright 1994, USA TODAY. Reprinted with
permission.
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INDEPENDENT SPIRIT
Justice Ginsburg Steers Middle Course in 1st Year
Copyright 1994 Newsday, Inc.
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By Timothy M. Phelps, Washington Bureau
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg did something
in her first year at the Supreme Court that no other
justice in history has ever done.
She moved upstairs.
Ginsburg, who has sometimes been accused
of being intellectually and personally aloof, turned
up her nose at the small chambers being vacated by
Justice Clarence Thomas on the marble-lined
first-floor hallway, traditionally occupied by the
junior justice.
Instead, Ginsburg moved into modest but
more spacious chambers for retired justices upstairs,
a flight away from her eight colleagues. The
61-year-old, New York-born jurist displayed the
same kind of independence in her rulings, which
were neither as liberal as White House officials
expected nor as conservative as many liberals had
feared.
Shortly after Ginsburg was confirmed, 96-3,
by the Senate, a White House official bragged of
having put one over on conservatives. He predicted
Ginsburg would be more liberal than Justice Harry
Blackmun. But in the term that just ended, Ginsburg
was almost as likely to vote to the right of Blackmun
as to vote with him on cases that had a discernible
liberal-conservative divide. In fact, in 54 of the 84
cases decided during the term, some of which had no
clear ideological bent, she voted with the court's
most conservative member, Thomas.
Although Ginsburg's place in the dead center
on a generally conservative court may have surprised
some in the White House, liberals concerned that she
would ally herself more with conservatives are so far
breathing a sigh of relief. "She has been somewhat
more liberal than some of us feared," said Herman
Schwartz, a law professor at American University in
Washington. But Schwartz said Ginsburg has yet to
be tested on some key issues, such as state regulation
of abortion rights.
The court in the term just past managed to
please civil libertarians as well as pro-business
conservatives while deciding fewer cases than any
court in 40 years. But the expected replacement of
Blackmun with a somewhat more conservative
Stephen Breyer could mean different results in the
term that begins in October. Breyer's confirmation
hearings begin Tuesday.
Ginsburg voted the liberal side of several
key issues. In perhaps the court's most important
ruling, she voted with Blackmun, John Paul Stevens
and David Souter against a majority decision
granting broad new rights to property owners against
zoning or environmental regulations that require
them to give up land or money.
The court said property rights will be
accorded the same deference as any other
fundamental liberty protected in the Constitution, a
pronouncement that the dissenters said could lead to
a wholesale redefinition of government's right to
regulate the economy.
She took a strong stand against mixing
church and state, joining a concurring opinion by
Stevens likening New York's creation of a special
school district allowing Hasidic Jews to run their
own public school in Kiryas Joel, N.Y., to
government-backed "segregation." The court ruled
6-3 that the special district was unconstitutional.
But in other areas, conservatives were more
likely to be pleased with Ginsburg's record. She
voted against organized labor in two important
decisions, one saying that government employers can
under some circumstances fire employees simply for
expressing opinions, and another reversing a
50-year-old Department of Labor rule that gave
longshoremen and mineworkers the benefit of doubt
in disability cases. But she voted on the other side in
two other labor cases, dissenting from decisions that
staff nurses are supervisors under the labor laws and
that railroad employees could not collect damages for
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In civil rights, Ginsburg's voting was also
mixed, despite her history of crusading for the legal
rights of women. She voted with the majority against
a requirement that Florida maximize the number of
seats for Latinos in the state Legislature, but
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dissented when the court ruled that a Georgia
county's single (and always white) commissioner
form of government was legal.
She signed the court's unanimous decision
making it easier for women to sue their employers
for sexual harassment, but she agreed with the
majority that the 1991 Civil Rights Act protecting
women and minorities should not be applied
retroactively. She was in the majority that ruled that
people could not be kept off a jury just because of
their gender.
Ginsburg disappointed those liberals who
had predicted she would oppose capital punishment.
For example, she voted to uphold the California
death penalty and to affirm the death sentences. But
she joined in a broad ruling by the court that said
condemned prisoners have a right to a stay of
execution and a lawyer while they appeal their state
convictions in federal court.
In other criminal cases Ginsburg was very
difficult to predict, voting as often with the
prosecution as with defendants.
In several major cases this term, liberals and
conservatives united to produce unanimous decisions.
All the justices agreed that a suburb of St. Louis had
violated the First Amendment right of free speech
when it prohibited signs in residential
neighborhoods. They also united to hold that
abortion clinics could sue Operation Rescue and
other anti-abortion groups using obstructionist tactics
for damages under the racketeering laws.
Ginsburg now is faced with another
precedent-setting decision during the court's
three-month summer recess. Will she move back
downstairs to occupy the spacious chambers of the
retiring Blackmun, a prime location overlooking the
Capitol?
Or will she continue to work one level above
her colleagues?
A Newsday article reprinted by permission,
Newsday, Inc., Copyright, 1994.
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A GENTLER COURT CONFIRMATION PROCESS EMERGES
Low-Key Hearings for Clinton Nominees Could Change Public Attitudes,
Scholars Suggest
Copyright 1994 The Washington Post
The Washington Post
July 18, 1994, Monday, Final Edition
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
It was Stephen G. Breyer at the witness table
last week, portraying himself as a judicial pragmatist
and offering occasional bits of whimsy.
But also under the lights was a new kind of
Supreme Court confirmation process. One that has
become depoliticized, or rather, pre-politicized.
President Clinton made sure before he
announced a successor to retiring Justice Harry A.
Blackmun that he had a nominee who was
competent, noncontroversial, and -- in case trouble
arose -- practically pre-approved. Breyer was the
consensus candidate of the White House and Senate
Judiciary Committee. (When the flap over Breyer's
Lloyd's of London investments came up, it was in
the committee's interest, too, for its former chief
counsel to successfully defend himself.)
It wasn't just that Clinton had greased the
skids. His choice of a mild-mannered moderate
virtually precluded the sort of showdown that
presidents since Lyndon B. Johnson have had over at
least one nomination.
Ronald Reagan sought to remake the court,
and when he chose Robert H. Bork in 1987, for
example, he was primed for a confrontation with
liberals. Clinton, conversely, doesn't view the court
as an engine of social change and is spending his
political capital on other battles.
The result of Clinton's approach was a
low-key confirmation hearing that departed radically
from the controversial hearings for Bork, who was
defeated, and Clarence Thomas, a George Bush
nominee who prevailed after a circus-like airing of
sexual harassment charges. Last week, there was half
the media, few lobbying groups and little national
interest.
And Clinton is likely to go two for two on
Supreme Court nominations. His first appointee,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, sailed through last year. A
committee vote on Breyer, a federal appeals judge,
is expected this week.
Some scholars suggest that the loss of
spectacle might mean more public confidence in the
nomination process and increased regard for the
court.
"We, the people of America, care deeply
about the court's results, its output," said Yale
University law professor Stephen L. Carter, "but we
focus on the nominations, the input."
Carter, who has written a book about the
nomination process, said Friday that "a series of
placid confirmations" might raise people's
understanding of the real work of the court. He has
written that strategy has become more important than
issues in confirmation hearings.
In a briefing with reporters before the
hearings began, Vice President Gore said the White
House is ending "the days in which Supreme Court
nominees were used as wedges to divide the country
and to promote political agendas." While GOP
presidents said they were merely seeking to undo
what liberal justices had wrought, the Clinton White
House did not choose Breyer or Ginsburg, both
moderates, to steer the court dramatically in any
direction.
Breyer's replacement of Blackmun, now the
most liberal justice, might actually move the court a
bit to the ideological right.
"It says something about the relative
differences in how Republicans and Democrats" view
the court, said Harvard University law professor
Laurence H. Tribe. "It was important to the Reagan
Revolution that efforts be made to capture the
court, " he said, referring to Reagan's desire to
appoint conservatives who opposed abortion and
affirmative action and wanted prayer in the public
schools.
"Judicial revolution" will not drive the
Democratic health care and welfare reform priorities,
Tribe said. He added that if health care or welfare
legislation ends up being challenged before the court,
Clinton will be best served by jurists who, like
Breyer, believe in great deference to Congress.
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Breyer presented himself over three days of
hearings as a man with no judicial agenda. Asked
about the hot issues of the day, he took refuge in
decided cases, telling senators what the law was, not
whether he wanted it otherwise.
He appeared to endorse abortion rights and
support capital punishment. He took a generous view
toward affirmative action and repeatedly talked about
America's melting pot of religions and the need to
keep government neutral toward all.
The Constitution, he repeated often, is "a
document ... guaranteeing people rights that will
enable them to lead lives of dignity." In one of his
most enthusiastic moments, Breyer called the
Constitution "a miracle."
He occasionally digressed to show that
despite his Stanford-Oxford-Harvard background he
is a regular guy. When Sen. Strom Thurmond
(R-S.C.) asked about professional baseball's antitrust
exemption, Breyer first answered: "I've always
thought baseball was special ever since my
grandfather used to take me to [a] stadium where
we'd pay 50 cents for the bleachers or $ 2.50 for a
box seat." (The antitrust rules are Congress's
domain, Breyer said.)
The stickiest moments concerned Breyer's
rulings on toxic waste cases that might have
financially benefited his Lloyd's of London insurance
syndicate. But he convinced senators that he could
not have known of any connections between his
rulings in pollution cases and the liability of the
syndicate, which underwrote insurance for
corporations facing pollution cleanup costs. Breyer's
chief benefactor on the committee, Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy (D-Mass.), hailed Breyer's integrity and
kept senators from too harshly questioning the
nominee.
In the end, Chairman Joseph R. Biden Jr.
(D-Del.) said he was starting to have "fun" again at
confirmation hearings. Ranking Republican Orrin G.
Hatch (Utah) complimented fellow senators for their
"sincerity and dedication."
o 1994. The Washington Post. Reprinted with
permission.
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PORTRAIT OF A PRAGMATIST
Confirmation Hearing for Breyer Elicits His Emphasis
on Rulings' Lasting Effects
Copyright 1994 The New York Times Company
The New York Times
July 14, 1994, Thursday, Late Edition - Final
Linda Greenhouse, Special to The New York Times
From his 13 years on a Federal appeals
court, it is apparent that Stephen G. Breyer is a
judge of moderate leanings, a self-described
pragmatist interested more in solutions than in
theories. Judge Breyer has said nothing to dislodge
that image during two days of testimony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee. To that extent, his
Supreme Court confirmation hearing has produced
little news.
What the hearing has accomplished, through
the nominee's responses to the friendly, open-ended
questions of admiring senators, is to construct a
portrait of what it means to be a judicial pragmatist.
It is a label open to easy caricature as an ad
hoc, small-bore, Mr. Fix-It of the law -- the
passionless technocrat, as Judge Breyer has himself
been caricatured at times.
But he has made clear during the hearing
that his form of pragmatism encompasses not only a
case-by-case approach to solving particular legal
problems but also a coherent vision of constitutional
and statutory interpretation, about which he has
spoken with considerable eloquence and even a hint
of passion.
At the heart of his approach is a view of the
Constitution as a "practical document" to be
understood not solely in light of its history but in
terms of "what life is like at the present," as Judge
Breyer explained today. Discussing how to interpret
the constitutional concept of liberty, he said, "One
tries to use a bit of understanding as to what a
holding one way or the other will mean for the
future."
"Law is not theoretical," he said at one
point. And at another: "Beware of fixed rules" that
look appealing on the surface but that can be a trap
rather than an aid for judges.
The dimensions of Judge Breyer's judicial
philosophy are important given the nature of the
Court he is about to join. The Supreme Court today
often appears miscast as the theater of a conventional
liberal-versus-conservative drama; with the
retirement of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, whom
Judge Breyer has been named to succeed, there is no
old-fashioned liberal remaining.
Rather, the fault line that often seems to
matter most on the Court today is the line that
separates the formalists who are drawn to rules and
categories, exemplified by Justice Antonin Scalia,
from Justices like John Paul Stevens who consider
themselves free -- or even bound -- to consider the
practical effect of their rulings.
Some of the major debates on the Court are
conducted along this fault line. Judge Breyer and
Justice Scalia, friendly sparring partners in many a
legal forum who have agreed to disagree on the
question, have conducted several witty but
nonetheless serious public debates on one of the most
disputed subjects: how to interpret statutes.
Law's Language, and Purpose
Justice Scalia, whose scorn for Congress is
often evident, believes in holding Congress to the
language it enacts into law, without recourse to
context or legislative history that could shed light on
the meaning of obtuse or inconsistent provisions.
By contrast, Judge Breyer, who as chief
counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee drafted
statutes before he assumed the job of interpreting
them, believes strongly in using any materials at
hand to try to figure out what Congress wanted to
achieve, and to interpret the law in a way that
harmonizes with its underlying purpose.
"I do think that laws are supposed to, when
fitted together, work according to their purposes," he
said today. "I don't think a court can know whether
an interpretation is correct until it understands both
the purpose and how the interpretation is likely, in
light of that purpose, to work out in the world. In
the actual world."
In the constitutional arena, one of the most
important debates on the Court is how to interpret
the 14th Amendment's due process guarantee in
deciding what protections a Government owes its
31
citizens. In Justice Scalia's view, the due process
clause must be interpreted in light of the most
specific level of protection that history and tradition
have treated as appropriate.
For example, in a case several years ago
Justice Scalia considered an unwed father's
constitutional claim to continued contact with his
daughter and rejected it on the ground that an
"adulterous natural father," as Justice Scalia put it,
had no historically protected legal interests. He
dismissed the argument of Justice William J.
Brennan Jr., who has since retired, that the inquiry
should be at the more general level of whether
"parenthood" itself has traditionally enjoyed legal
protection.
'A Heart and a Head'
Although Judge Breyer has not addressed
himself to any specific case during his confirmation
hearing, it is abundantly clear that he rejects Justice
Scalia's method. Speaking generally today, he said
that while knowledge of the past is valuable, so is
knowledge of what a legal opinion will mean for the
present and the future.
"Law requires both a heart and a head," he
said. "If you don't have a heart, it becomes a sterile
set of rules removed from human problems, and it
won't help. If you don't have a head, there's the risk
that in trying to decide a particular person's problem
in a case that may look fine for that person, you
cause trouble for a lot of other people, making their
lives yet worse."
"It's a question of balance," he concluded.
His avoidance of any single approach to
legal interpretation places Judge Breyer squarely
within the tradition of legal pragmatism that, on the
Supreme Court, has included Justices like Oliver
Wendell Holmes and Benjamin N. Cardozo. He has
paid homage to Holmes throughout the hearing,
beginning with his opening statement, in which he
said that "everything in the law is related to every
other thing, and always, as Holmes pointed out, that
whole law reflects not so much logic as history and
experience."
A 'Relentless Optimist'
Despite his evident sophistication about the
ways of Washington, Judge Breyer has displayed a
marked absence of cynicism. "He really thinks you
can usually harmonize the legal constraints with what
makes good sense," Paul Gewirtz, a Yale Law
School professor, said today.
Professor Gewirtz, who serves as director of
a task force on racial and sex bias that Judge Breyer
set up for his appeals court, said in an interview that
such a goal "sounds modest until you realize how
many people are uncomfortable talking about the
general purposes of our legal institutions." Calling
Judge Breyer a "relentless optimist," Professor
Gewirtz said, "Always, at the end of the day, his
question is, Is this an interpretation that makes
sense?"
As the Supreme Court's junior Justice, Judge
Breyer may not have much chance to use the
management skills he has practiced as chief judge of
his present court, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, in Boston. In the Justices'
conferences, the junior member speaks last and often
has no substantial role other than to be the
designated note-taker.
But it is at least possible that he can lead by
example, if not by official position, on the subject of
how to minimize dissent and persuade Justices to
sign one another's opinions.
"It is a question on our court of each judge
listening to the other," he said today. He added that
if there is an area of disagreement that is "so much
more important to another person, you listen to the
argument, and even if you say in the opinion, 'It
might be argued that, but we reject that,' the other
judge is much happier because the point of view is
taken into account, and that tends to draw people
together."
"When the different judges understand that
their own ego is less at stake, " he said, "you don't
stick on every little minor thing."
Copyright © 1994 by The New York Times
Company. Reprinted by permission.
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BREYER GIVES VIEW OF HOW HE 'JUDGES'
Justice Requires 'Heart and a Head'
Copyright 1994 The Washington Post
The Washington Post
July 14, 1994, Thursday, Final Edition
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
Supreme Court nominee Stephen G. Breyer
yesterday espoused views that would put him
comfortably near the ideological center of the current
court and offered senators a rare window into how
he "judges."
During a second day of testimony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, a relaxed Breyer said
judges should not always check their own beliefs at
the courtroom door: "After all, if you think there's
some terrible injustice, maybe there is."
Breyer continued to try to dispel the view of
some critics that he is more interested in institutions
than individuals. He said the law requires both a
"heart and a head."
"If you don't have a heart," Breyer said, "it
becomes a sterile set of rules removed from human
problems, and it won't help. If you don't have a
head, there's the risk that in trying to decide a
particular person's problem ... you cause trouble for
a lot of other people.... So it's a question of
balance."
Overall, seven hours of testimony yesterday
suggested that Breyer would align himself on the
court with President Clinton's first nominee, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg.
In a notable departure from the views of the
more conservative court majority, Breyer said
property rights should not get the same constitutional
protections as speech rights and privacy interests. He
distanced himself from a recent ruling in which the
court strengthened constitutional protections for
property owners.
The court ruled last month that the "takings
clause" of the Constitution, which bars government
taking of private property without just compensation,
prohibited the increasingly common local
government practice of requiring property owners
seeking building and zoning permits to donate part of
their land for community use. The court said that the
"takings clause" should not be "relegated to the
status of a poor relation" in comparison to individual
rights such as free speech and privacy.
Breyer rejected that argument. He said that
while the Constitution puts a high value on speech
and privacy, it did not enact a "specific kind of
economic theory" that could guide the nation over
time.
Throughout yesterday's session, Clinton's
nominee to succeed retiring Justice Harry A.
Blackmun continued to face generally kid-glove
treatment as the 14-year federal appeals court veteran
gave the committee a seminar on judging.
He detailed his method for balancing
constitutional dilemmas, explained that consensus is
important because it leads to more understandable
opinions and even got down to the nitty-gritty of
decision writing.
He said he writes his at a computer. And he
said he follows the advice of federal appeals Judge
John Minor Wisdom: "If you want to write a purple
passage because you feel so strongly, write it and
don't use it, because people want your result and are
not necessarily interested in your feelings."
Breyer also for the first time specifically
answered senators' questions about a potential
conflict of interest arising from his rulings in several
toxic-waste cases and his relationship with a Lloyd's
of London insurance syndicate. He said he now
accepts the view of a University of Pennsylvania law
professor who said it was "possibly imprudent" for
a judge to have such an investment.
Although the hearings were reminiscent of
law school classes, popular legal issues crept in.
Sen. Herb Kohl (D-Wis.) asked whether Breyer
thought the pretrial publicity in the O.J. Simpson
murder case would prejudice potential members of a
jury. He refused to answer specifically but said,
"You're worried about the fairness of the trial,
you're worried about the maintenance of a free
press, and somehow the balancing of those things is
terribly important and isn't necessarily just forjudges."
Breyer also dodged a question from Sen.
Hank Brown (R-Colo.) on whether presidents are
immune under the Constitution from lawsuits for
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actions not related to their official duties. The
subtext was a pending lawsuit against Clinton
alleging sexual harassment.
Through the gentle give-and-take, Breyer
repeated his firm views about the separation of
church and state and said that judges, when
considering the fate of defendants, should be aware
of how violent crime has gotten out of control. He
nodded when Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.)
suggested courts should balance concern about
defendants' rights with the threat of crime to the
general public.
Today is expected to be Breyer's last before
the committee. Outside witnesses for and against the
nominee would testify Friday.
In response to questions from Sen. Arlen
Specter (R-Pa.) about the social role of judges,
Breyer said, "Everyone is against judges legislating"
from the bench. "But how do you know whether
what you are doing is improperly legislating,
improperly putting in your own subjective views?"
Breyer asked.
Breyer said that while a judge should look at
the text of a law at the core of a dispute and earlier
rulings interpreting it, the judge should also rely on
his knowledge of history and present needs. "The
present and past traditions of our people are
important because they can show how past language
reflecting past values ... apply in present
circumstances," he said.
Breyer, who kept a pocket-size edition of the
Constitution in front of him as he spoke, often cited
-- as tools for judging the text of a law -- its history,
legal precedent, the conditions of life in the past, the
present and "a little bit of projection into the future."
When Clinton nominated Breyer, he
emphasized his ability to build consensus among the
justices. "Consensus is important," Breyer said
yesterday to Sen. Howell T. Heflin (D-Ala.)
"because ... eventually the labor union, the big
business, small business, everyone else in the
country has to understand how they are supposed to
act or not act according to the law. And consensus
helps produce the simplicity that will enable the law
to be effective."
But Breyer refused to join Brown's view that
the Supreme Court had gone too far in some of its
church-state cases, "to the point," according to the
senator, "of protecting people from religion, that is,
restricting their ability to give a prayer at a
commencement and so on."
Breyer said the court should be careful how
much religion it allows in secular institutions.
Breyer on Tuesday endorsed current abortion
rights rulings. Yesterday, answering Sen. Carol
Moseley-Braun (D-Ill.), Breyer said the right to
privacy stems from the constitutional guarantee of
liberty. He said that the notion of liberty embodied
in the 14th Amendment goes beyond rights
specifically listed in the Constitution.
Staff researcher Ann O'Hanlon contributed
to this report.
o 1994. The Washington Post. Reprinted with
permission.
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GROUP CONTENDS BREYER INVENTED PRIVACY RIGHT
Did Nominee Pave Way for Abortion?
Copyright 1994 Legal Communications, Ltd.
The Legal Intelligencer
June 16, 1994, Thursday
Richard Carelli, Associated Press
AGAIN, ABORTION looms as an issue in
a Supreme Court confirmation. This time it's Judge
Stephen Breyer, accused by conservatives of helping
invent the concept of a constitutional right of privacy
that paved the way for legalized abortion nationwide.
But Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz,
a longtime Breyer friend, says the group's
fact-finding is "just wrong."
The controversy, focusing on Breyer's year
of service in 1964-65 as a law clerk for
then-Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, likely
will spark some questions when Breyer appears
before the Senate Judiciary Committee beginning
July 12.
LITTLE RESISTANCE
All signs point to no serious Senate
resistance to Breyer becoming the nation's 108th
high court justice. But questions about the right of
privacy have played a part in all Supreme Court
confirmations since the Senate rejected President
Reagan's nomination of Robert H. Bork in 1987.
Angela "Bay" Buchanan, president of
American Cause, the conservative group chaired by
her brother, commentator and former presidential
candidate Patrick Buchanan, said Breyer's
performance as a law clerk 30 years ago indicates
"he will legislate from the bench."
She noted historical references to Breyer's
drafting of Goldberg's concurring opinion in a
landmark 1965 decision in which the court struck
down a Connecticut law that made it a crime to use
contraceptives.
MARITAL PRIVACY
The then-liberal court ruled, in an opinion
by Justice William 0. Douglas, that the law wrongly
interfered with marital privacy.
Never before had the high court recognized
a personal right of privacy outside of the
constitutional protection against unreasonable police
searches.
The Constitution does not mention the word
"privacy," but Douglas wrote: "Specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras (shadows),
formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance. Various
guarantees (in various amendments) create zones of
privacy."
The Douglas opinion, viewed as a prime
example of judicial activism, is often ridiculed by
conservatives.
Justice Clarence Thomas, one of the high
court's most conservative members, displays a sign
in his chambers that declares: "Please don't emanate
in the penumbras."
Goldberg agreed with Douglas in the 1965
case, but wrote separately to emphasize his view that
the little-used Ninth Amendment is a source of
personal privacy.
The amendment says, "The enumeration in
the Constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."
NINTH AMENDMENT
Goldberg's opinion said marital privacy is "a
personal right 'retained by the people' within the
meaning of the Ninth Amendment."
The court relied on the 1965 decision in
Griswold v. Connecticut eight years later when it
ruled in Roe v. Wade that women have a
constitutional right to abortion.
"Mr. Breyer is credited with drafting the .
decision that created the so-called right to privacy,"
Bay Buchanan said. "For almost 200 years, the
presence of this right in the Constitution had escaped
the notice of Supreme Court justices -- until the
young Mr. Breyer suddenly found it."
That's not the way it happened, Dershowitz
said in an interview.
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"Anyone who knew Goldberg knew he was
a very opinionated guy," said Dershowitz, who
clerked for the justice a year before Breyer.
"This is how Goldberg worked -- after a
case was argued, he'd call both law clerks and the
secretary into his office. He's say, 'This is how I'm
going to decide this case,' and start dictating off the
top of his head," Dershowitz said.
"We'd take notes like crazy because he
would tell one of the clerks, 'I want you to draft an
opinion saying that.' The Ninth Amendment was
something Goldberg was talking about the year I
clerked for him," Dershowitz said. "He would ask,
'Why doesn't anybody quote the Ninth Amendment?'
He has a passion for it. It wasn't Steve's brainchild."
Dershowitz, a liberal, said he wishes
Buchanan's view of Breyer were correct. "I hope
she's right, but she's not," he said.
"Steve's not a liberal, but a pragmatist. The
Buchanan statement is just wrong."
REHNQUIST NOMINATION
The last time a Supreme Court nominee's
service as a Supreme Court clerk played any role in
his confirmation was when liberal critics of
then-Justice William H. Rehnquist opposed his 1986
elevation to chief justice.
They noted that as a law clerk for Justice
Robert Jackson, Rehnquist in 1952 drafted an
opinion that argued against racially integrating
America's public schools.
In its landmark Brown v. Board of
Education case decided in 1954, the court ruled
unanimously that segregated education of white and
black children was unconstitutional.
Rehnquist said later that the draft opinion
did not reflect his views, but had been requested by
Jackson.
Reprinted with permission
The Legal Intelligencer
36
PLAUDITS DROWN OUT CRITICS AS SENATE CONFIRMS BREYER
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By Linda Greenhouse, Special to The New York Times
The Senate today confirmed Judge Stephen
G. Breyer as the nation's 108th Supreme Court
Justice by a vote of 87 to 9.
The vote, which followed unanimous
approval last week in the Senate Judiciary
Committee, came after more than five hours of
scripted debate on the Senate floor. With
confirmation a foregone conclusion, senators took to
the floor one at a time to state their views about the
nominee to a largely empty chamber.
Praise for President Clinton's second
Supreme Court nominee was bipartisan. Senator
Edward M. Kennedy, the Massachusetts Democrat
who was Judge Breyer's principal sponsor, said the
California-born Boston judge would bring "a New
Englander's common sense" to the Court as well as
a "needed and practical perspective." Senator Alan
K. Simpson, Republican of Wyoming, said Judge
Breyer would be "a superb addition to the High
Court."
Judge Breyer, who was named to succeed
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, will probably be sworn
in next week in a private ceremony either at the
Court or at the White House. That will enable him
to get to work on the Court's docket for the next
term. The Court will hold a public investiture in late
September, before the new term opens on Oct. 3.
9 Republicans in Opposition
The nine votes against confirmation came
from Republicans, who cited various reasons for
opposing it. Senator Richard G. Lugar of Indiana,
who had emerged in the last week as Judge Breyer's
leading critic, said the nominee had displayed
"extraordinarily bad judgment" by investing in a
Lloyd's of London insurance syndicate that has
suffered heavy losses.
Senator Lugar said Judge Breyer was
"trapped" in the investment, despite his stated desire
to extricate himself, and was "unlikely to escape for
a long time." Because the syndicate in which Judge
Breyer invested has insured companies that are
facing the possibility of legal action over pollution,
Judge Breyer will have to recuse himself from "a
long string of cases," Senator Lugar said. "Another
candidate who has equal qualifications and is free of
Judge Breyer's personal predicament should be
nominated."
While the 55-year-old Judge Breyer has the
qualifications for "significant public service, "
Senator Lugar said, his poor judgment means that he
is not entitled to confirmation to a lifetime job that
will place him "beyond re-evaluation" in the future.
Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum, the Ohio
Democrat who was Judge Breyer's chief critic during
the Judiciary Committee hearing, said he agreed with
Senator Lugar but was nonetheless voting for
confirmation "with serious reservations and a heavy
heart." He said that because he had voted for
Republican Supreme Court nominees, including
Justice Antonin Scalia, he felt obliged this time to
support President Clinton's choice.
'Man of Integrity,' Hatch Says
Other senators said the focus on Judge
Breyer's investment was unfair, given the Judiciary
Committee's determination that he had not
improperly participated in any cases that might have
affected his financial interests. "We cannot impose a
standard that people cannot make bad investments,"
said Senator Orrin G. Hatch of Utah. "People do."
Senator Hatch, the ranking Republican on
the Judiciary Committee, was a strong supporter of
Judge Breyer, the committee's former chief counsel.
"We know him," the Senator said. "He's a man of
integrity, a man of exceptional legal ability."
The Republican senators who voted against
confirmation, in addition to Senator Lugar, were
Conrad Burns of Montana, Daniel R. Coats of
Indiana, Paul Coverdell of Georgia, Jesse Helms of
North Carolina, Trent Lott of Mississippi, Frank H.
Murkowski of Alaska, Don Nickles of Oklahoma and
Robert C. Smith of New Hampshire.
A number of these opponents are among the
Senate's most conservative members. While some in
addition to Senator Lugar mentioned the Lloyd's
investment, the more important reason for their
opposition appeared to be their objection to Judge
Breyer's views.
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"I just don't feel he's the right man,"
Senator Lott said. He said Judge Breyer lacked a
commitment to "fundamental rights such as private
property" and had presided over the design of a
"lavish" new Federal courthouse in Boston, where
Judge Breyer is the chief judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Four senators were absent for the vote
today: Dave Durenberger, Republican of Minnesota;
Bob Graham, Democrat of Florida; Claiborne Pell,
Democrat of Rhode Island, and Malcolm Wallop,
Republican of Wyoming.
Praise for Mitchell
One of the few spontaneous moments
occurred just before the vote, after Senator George
J. Mitchell, the majority leader, delivered the final
speech, praising Judge Breyer as an "excellent
choice" who "brings compassion and intellect to the
Federal bench." Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., the
Delaware Democrat who heads the Judiciary
Committee, appeared to take Senator Mitchell by
surprise when he said he regretted that the majority
leader had taken himself out of contention for the
Supreme Court vacancy.
Mr. Mitchell, a Maine Democrat who is
leaving the Senate this year, was the early favorite
for the vacancy until he surprised the White House
by withdrawing his name. "I hope the opportunity
will come again," Senator Biden said.
Copyright * 1994 by The New York Times
Company. Reprinted by permission.
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'LITLE PEOPLE' LOSE A VOICE
Blackmun Put People Over Precedents
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Justice Harry A. Blackmun's retirement this
summer will leave the Supreme Court with an
obvious gap: It will have no judge willing to keep a
thumb on the scale of the law to make it weigh in
favor of "the little people."
That is how Blackmun has seen his job for
years, that is what has led most court observers to
label him a "liberal," and that is why he sometimes
is criticized for appearing to opt for results more
than for legal principle.
Without a justice inclined that way, the court
after Blackmun is likely to be seen as moving even
further toward the center of the judicial spectrum --
which revolves around the idea that the law is not an
engine of social reform. Reform, in that view, is
primarily for legislatures, not courts.
Blackmun's presence on the Supreme Court,
and his view of the law as a safeguard for hapless
individuals who get caught up in government rules or
prohibitions, has been far more pleasing to liberals
on the left than to conservatives on the right.
After the Supreme Court's self-proclaimed
liberals -- Justices William J. Brennan Jr., William
0. Douglas and Thurgood Marshall -- departed,
Blackmun remained the one justice who could be
counted on to speak out and write vigorously to
promote the same kinds of results.
Now, none of the potential nominees
figuring in speculation about a new justice, would be
likely to approach the task of judging according to
what might be called "Blackmun's law."
Although Blackmun has been considered a
legal scholar who is good at employing the language
and the logic of the law, he has been stirred more
often -- in cases he thinks will affect the powerless
or the deprived or the needy -- by broad notions
such as "decency and human dignity" or "the
precepts of civilization we profess." Those are social
or even moral value phrases more than they are
legal, and they are phrases that Blackmun has used
to describe his view of law's highest function.
And, as his most predictable adversary
within the Supreme Court, Justice Antonin Scalia,
has complained, such phrases are so open-ended that
they let justices create, rather than follow, the law.
Those sweeping phrases do not show up
routinely in the writing of the other liberal-oriented
justice, John Paul Stevens. He votes often with
Blackmun, but the law according to Stevens is far
more disciplined, less expansive and more
traditional.
The Blackmun approach is one that
frequently finds government power to control
individuals' lives to be wrong or even excessive, and
leads more often to a kind of "loose construction" of
the law.
It has gotten Blackmun into trouble with
critics for the way it led him to view a right of
privacy, loosely anchored to actual words in the
Constitution, as the basis for a woman's right to seek
an abortion with only her doctor's consent. The
abortion decision, Roe vs. Wade, did not start out in
Blackmun's contemplation as a profound act of
constitutional creation, and he never saw it as that.
His first drafts were narrow applications of past
precedent.
But as he looked into the elemental bond
between a woman and her obstetrician, he saw that
relationship as a social equation demanding privacy
against government control.
Roe vs. Wade, and the sequel he wrote in
1986 obviously were not all that Blackmun has
written in his 24 years as a justice. But no other
opinions display as clearly his way of deciding.
The justice believes, as he said Wednesday,
that he has not changed over the years. Noting that
he and Stevens recently joked about how they were
considered the remaining liberals, he said they
agreed that "neither of us has changed; the court has
changed under us."
Whether the most famous of Blackmun's
judicial writings show a change or merely a
progression, there is something they do not show:
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how caught up he is in the plight of what he called
-- meaning no insult -- "the little people."
He would try to see through legalisms to
human detail, to the pain, the loss, the denial that he
could trace to legal commands or even to legal
neutrality. At those times, he would seem far more
sentimental than judicial.
He would interrupt a lawyer to ask what a
scene really looked like, or how the people involved
had reacted. He even asked one lawyer if she had
read a particular novel that would have given human
meaning to her legal points.
Reprinted with permission, Chicago Sun-Times
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AN IDEOLOGICAL ODYSSEY NEARS END
Jurist Says He Was Not Transformed: 'The Court Has Changed'
Copyright 1994 The Washington Post
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Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
Supreme Court Justice Harry A. Blackmun
was occasionally spotted standing alone at the top of
the court's marble steps, lost in the shadows of the
structure's massive pillars, watching the
demonstrations below or observing the lines forming
to attend one of the court's public sessions.
From time to time, he would comb through
the thousands of letters his chambers received each
year, to see what people were thinking and saying
about him and the court. And in each case the court
considered, Blackmun would make a point of
knowing who the individuals involved were, and
where they lived -- not just the law at issue.
Blackmun changed a lot during his 24 years
on the court, more so than most justices. In fact, he
is famous for his ideological odyssey, starting as a
judicial conservative in alliance with Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger and ending two decades later as
the most liberal member of the court.
While he does not acknowledge his
transformation (he says the court changed more than
he did), his comments in opinions, speeches and
interviews suggest that his personal experiences as a
justice, the things he observed, and his interest in the
lives of the "little people, " as he once called them,
all played a role in it.
Blackmun, 85, refused to accept the notion
that a judge should be removed from the real world.
"He asked, 'What does this mean in real life?' " said
Beth Heifetz, a law clerk to Blackmun in 1985-86.
"That outlook necessarily means that you will
consider and reconsider" the legal dilemmas of the
day.
Most recently, for example, he broke with
his past opinions and decided that the death penalty
was unconstitutional. The reason: He had observed
the system of capital punishment, he said, and it was
fraught with discrimination and mistakes. "From this
day forward," he wrote in February, "I no longer
shall tinker with the machinery of death."
While Blackmun's impassioned approach is
lauded by some, respect among legal scholars has
been limited. Critics said his approach has been too
emotional and that he has turned his back on court
precedent and failed to provide guiding principles to
lower courts and those who would live under the
law.
Blackmun, a 1970 appointee of President
Richard M. Nixon, has resisted the popular opinion
that he changed during his tenure. At a news
conference yesterday, he said that he and Justice
John Paul Stevens, who was named by President
Gerald R. Ford in 1975, "were joking the other day,
in a coffee break somewhere" about how the two are
now considered the court's liberals.
"And each of us has steadfastly adhered to
the proposition that neither of us changed. The court
has changed under us."
But when Nixon appointed Blackmun to
succeed Abe Fortas 24 years ago -- after the
president's first two choices (Clement Haynsworth
Jr. and G. Harrold Carswell) were rejected by the
Senate -- Blackmun had a reputation as a judicial
conservative. A 1932 Harvard law graduate and
former resident counsel for the Mayo Clinic
(1950-59), Blackmun had spent 11 years on the 8th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which covers seven
states in the center of the country, from Minnesota
to Arkansas.
In early high-court cases, Blackmun was so
aligned in his voting pattern with conservative Chief
Justice Burger, a childhood chum from St. Paul, that
the two were dubbed "The Minnesota Twins."
Yet, within three years, Blackmun wrote
arguably the most significant and "liberal activist"
opinion of the post-Warren era, Roe v. Wade,
making abortion legal nationwide. He said women
had a fundamental right to abortion, arising from a
constitutional right of privacy embodied primarily in
the 14th Amendment's guarantee of personal liberty.
Relying on his own legal-medical
background at the Mayo Clinic, Blackmun included
in his opinion a long analysis of the state of
obstetrics in America.
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To many court scholars, Roe marked a
change in Blackmun's overall approach. "As if stung
by the attacks, including consistent charges of having
created 'ambiguous and uncertain' rights out of
whole cloth, Blackmun's jurisprudence appeared to
begin actively to change," Henry J. Abraham wrote
in his book, "Justices & Presidents."
Blackmun became an ally of liberal stalwart
Justice William J. Brennan Jr., who retired in 1990.
Blackmun now is the court's most liberal justice, apt
to broadly interpret constitutional guarantees and
read into federal statutes rights that may not be
explicitly written in.
"This is a guy who came to the court
thinking it was the role of the court to defer to
government," said Yale University law professor
Harold Koh, who clerked for Blackmun in 1981-82.
"But as he read the cases, he realized that all
government wasn't good and there was a lot of
suffering. In a series of cases, he began siding with
the outsiders: women facing tough choices on
abortion, the gays, the aliens."
Blackmun's evolution from a restrained and
formal interpreter of the law to a man who would
write emotionally about the plight of victims in
America captures the competing judicial philosophies
of the era. Blackmun, however, was more of a
conservative when the liberals still held sway in the
1970s, and revealed his most liberal voice after
William H. Rehnquist took over as chief justice in
1986.
Blackmun yinged when the majority yanged.
As a result, aside from Roe, his legacy is embodied
in a select number of majority opinions.
After Roe, he continued to take the lead on
questions of personal privacy. In a separate area of
the law, Blackmun was at the fore of developing the
court's view that commercial speech is entitled to
First Amendment protection close to that
traditionally allowed political speech.
Overall, Blackmun adopted a broad reading
of anti-discrimination law and supported a high wall
of separation between church and state. When
Brennan and other liberals had control in these areas,
Blackmun typically signed onto an opinion by
Brennan, the more senior justice.
As the liberals lost ground, Blackmun's most
passionate writing was in dissents and concurring
statements. Reacting to a 1989 ruling that made it
harder for workers to sue for job discrimination,
Blackmun wrote, "One wonders whether the majority
still believes that race discrimination -- or, more
accurately, race discrimination against non-whites --
is a problem in our society, or even remembers that
it ever was."
When the Supreme Court narrowly upheld
the right to abortion in 1992, yet cut back on the
underpinnings of his legacy, he said in a dissenting
statement: "For today, the women of this nation still
retain the liberty to control their destinies. But the
signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind
blows."
Yesterday, when President Clinton praised
Blackmun's record, he cited the justice's dissenting
statement to a 1989 ruling that the injuries of an
abused Wisconsin boy, Joshua DeShaney, could not
be redressed by suing an allegedly neglectful social
services agency. Many other lawyers have ridiculed
Blackmun's drama.
"Poor Joshua!" Blackmun said. "Victim of
repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying,
cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by
[the social services workers] who placed him in a
dangerous predicament and who knew or learned
what was going on, and yet did essentially nothing...
.It is a sad commentary upon American life."
Blackmun, who was born in Nashville, Ill.,
on Nov. 12, 1908, and moved soon after to St. Paul,
where his father ran a grocery store, is likely to be
remembered as a loner more than a leader. Garrison
Keillor once dubbed him "the shy person's justice."
At the court, Blackmun spent long hours
alone in the library. "I think this is a lonely job,
despite the fact that we sit as a group of nine, "
Blackmun said last year in an interview with
"Nightline." "When it comes down to it, we have to
make our individual answers to every issue, and I've
found that the loneliness does not decrease by the
fact of a multiple-judge court."
Former law clerk Heifetz, who now works
for a Washington firm, said that the routine and pace
of his schedule at the court reveals his approach to
judging:
"It is ordered and it is balanced. He says
you have to look at all the parts of life. He takes
time to exercise and read the newspapers, especially
the sports."
Former clerks said Blackmun's bookish
demeanor conceals a sense of humor. Each week
after the justices finished voting in secret on the
cases, Blackmun would convene his four clerks to
tell them how the sessions went. Recalled one former
clerk, "He would do this by impersonating each
justice. And he does a very good Justice [Sandra
Day] O'Connor."
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He tweaked his colleagues in person, too.
Blackmun revealed in a 1982 television interview
that the year before, some justices had heard a faint
electronic ringing sound in their secret conference
room and thought the room was bugged. Blackmun
knew it was the sound of his hearing aid but,
"feeling mischievous," waited a few days to tell the
others.
Dan Coenen, a 1979-80 law clerk and now
professor at the University of Georgia Law School,
said, "I was struck from day one that he never
displayed any haughtiness.
"He is a humble person. And an organizing
principle of Justice Blackmun's work in recent years
is concern for the little person, the poor, African
Americans, people who have had to struggle."
When a court majority in 1986 rejected
arguments about homosexual rights and upheld a
Georgia law making sodomy a crime, Blackmun said
in a dissent that individuals should have the freedom
"to choose the form and nature of ... intensely
personal bonds."
"It's been a great privilege, really, to be
here for these many years," Blackmun said at the
news conference yesterday in one of the court's
ornate reception rooms. "And I don't want to set any
records" for longevity.
He said that while "the tensions built up" on
various legal disputes, he enjoyed his colleagues and
his job. And while no other justice joined him earlier
this year in denouncing capital punishment,
Blackmun said that one justice, a man, had told him,
"I'm very proud of you for taking that position."
After a few minutes of light questioning, a
public information officer motioned for an end. He
seemed a bit reluctant to relinquish the moment in
the spotlight, and just as he was at the door of the
room, Blackmun abruptly turned back.
With a wide grin, he held up his arms,
almost as if he were declaring victory. With the
sleeves of his blue suit up to his elbows, Blackmun
looked less the modest, unassuming justice, than a
politician acknowledging a place in history and
bidding farewell.
Staff researcher Ann O'Hanlon contributed
to this report.
o 1994. The Washington Post. Reprinted with
permission.
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JUSTICES SAY FAREWELL
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Here are reactions from some of Supreme
Court Justice Harry A. Blackmun's colleagues to his
announcement that he will retire:
* Justice David H. Souter: "I dissent."
* Justice Sandra Day O'Connor: "With
Justice Blackmun's retirement, following so soon that
of Justice (Byron R.) White, we will have lost much
of the institutional memory of the court. His
presence here for 24 years has been marked by
compassion for individual litigants and by careful
attention to detail. We will miss him."
* Justice John Paul Stevens: "Justice
Blackmun is the quintessential gentleman and
scholar. His judicial work combines meticulous
accuracy and sensitive awareness of the impact of
our decisions on the real world. Far more than most
of us, he has labored to make the law the servant of
justice and decency. I am honored by his friendship
and shall miss his wise counsel."
* Justice Clarence Thomas: "It was an honor
to have worked with Justice Blackmun, and I am
saddened to see him retire; he will be deeply missed.
He is a friend and colleague, and it has been a
pleasure to work with him."
* Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist:
"Justice Blackmun has made significant contributions
to the court's jurisprudence . . . . On a personal
note, he was the only member of the court whom I
knew when I came 22 years ago and I shall miss
him."
* Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in a note to
Blackmun: "You have shown us all that it is possible
constantly to grow in wisdom and in humanity. And
when you ask questions, they are the best. A sample
from 20 years ago is enclosed. You helped me to
end on a high note that day." She enclosed part of
the transcript of a 1974 case that she argued as an
attorney before the high court.
* Retired Justice William J. Brennan:
"Justice Harry Blackmun has served with enormous
distinction during 24 terms on the court and
throughout his career. The combination of abiding
humility, deep compassion, formidable legal insight
and a tireless work ethic have made Justice
Blackmun a magnificent jurist, an admirable human
being and a wonderful friend."
* Retired Justice Byron R. White: "Justice
Blackmun has left many important and meaningful
tracts on the federal law throughout his 34 years as
a jurist. He was a very satisfactory colleague and has
had a great career."
Reprinted with permission
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